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QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the trial and appellate courts erred in holding 
appellants Gardner and Hernandez personally liable on the contract 
between Foreign Auto Works, Inc., Poggio and Dinero Services, Inc. 
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION 
This brief in opposition asks the court to deny review of the 
Utah Court of Appeals1 Opinion (for publication) dated January 2, 
1990. 
JURISDICTIONAL GROUND^ 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. Sec. 78-2-2(3)(a) and Rule 42 of the Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court. This brief in opposition has been timely filed 
under Rule 4 5 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court in that 
petitioner's Petition for Writ of Certiorari was filed February 28, 
1990. Respondent made timely motion for an extension of time to 
answer on April 2, 1990. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASp 
For purposes of this petition respondent generally accepts 
the statement of the case given in petitioner's Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For purposes of this petition respondent generally accepts the 
statement of facts given in petitioner's Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari with the following additions. 
1. On November 27, 1979, Gardner and Hernandez and Poggio 
executed a written agreement in the office of attorney Jackson 
Howard in Provo, Utah. (Findings of Fact p. 5, no. 15, see 
Appendix B). 
2. The December 29 agreement was executed by the same 
parties and in the same fashion as was the November 27th agreement. 
(Findings of Fact p. 7, no. 25, see Appendix B). 
3. On February 8, 1980 a written agreement was executed 
between Dinero Services, Inc. by Anthony Hernandez as President and 
Foreign Auto Works, Inc. by Poggio as President and by Poggio. The 
agreement involved the same transaction as the previous two. 
(Findings of Fact, p. 9, no. 33, see Appendix B). 
4. Gardner and Hernandez ostensibly under the name of Dinero 
Services Inc., individually and on behalf of FAW executed a further 
agreement dated April 14, 1980, "the agreement of April.11 The 
agreement of April 14 was prepared by counsel for Gardner and 
Hernandez. The court finds that said agreement, as well as the 
agreement of February 8, 1980, were intended to be between Poggio, 
individually, and on behalf of FAW on the one hand and Gardner and 
Hernandez on the other: that Dinero Services Inc. was not 
considered by the parties as an operative entity as far as the 
dealings between the parties were concerned; that the said 
agreement of April 14, 1980, was intended by the parties to 
supercede all previous agreements and dealings between Poggio and 
FAW on the one hand and Gardner and Hernandez on the other. This 
agreement was entered into between the parties because the February 
8, 1980, agreement had technically been terminated by the non-
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occurrence of a condition subsequent (transfer of the Mazda 
franchise by March 1, 1980), the representations of Mazda that the 
franchise would not be transferred to an entity which also operated 
the Fiat franchise, and because of continuing disagreement between 
the parties as to the value of the assets involved and the debts 
of FAW which had Bulk Sales implications. (Findings of Fact, p. 
12, 13, no. 47, see Appendix B) (emphasis added). 
5. Judge Cullen Y. Christensen1s above finding was based 
upon the history of the transactions and the hearing of evidence 
as shown in petitioners Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion 
to Dismiss where they state: "These defendants have earlier argued 
to the Court that the proper defendant to an action on the April 
14, 1980 agreement is Dinero Services. . .The Court has already 
ruled against these defendants on that issue, concluding that 
defendant Hernandez and Gardner are the real parties in interest. 
These defendants will not attempt to reargue that ruling." 
(Petitioners Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss, p. 2, see Appendix C, Exhibit 1). 
Arguments 
I, The Court of Appeals was correct in affirming the trial courts 
decision to hold Hernandez and Gardner personally liable on the 
April 14, 1980 agreement. Both parties had the opportunity to 
present, brief and argue their case in front of Judge Christensen 
prior to his ruling, consequently it cannot be said that the trial 
court abused it's discretion. 
The trial court did not abuse it!s discretion in the present 
case, consequently the appellate court coul$ not have reversed the 
3 
decision in regards to Hernandez1 and Gardner's claim. 
The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether 
the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two 
or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the 
facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute 
it decision for that of the trial court. Shamblin v. 
Brattain, 749 P.2d 339, 341 (Cal. 1988). 
The trial Judge heard numerous pretrial motions, and had close 
contact with the parties. He had more than sufficient information 
to make his ruling. As cited by the Appeals Court, Judge 
Christensen ruled at the beginning of trial 
that Gardner and Hernandez were personally liable under 
the April agreement and the trial proceeded with that 
ruling in place. The court found that Gardner and 
Hernandez were the real parties in interest, that they 
were intended as parties to the agreement, and that 
"Dinero Services Inc. was not considered by the parties 
as an operative entity as far as the dealings between the 
parties were concerned.11 (Utah Court of Appeals1 Opinion 
(for publication) dated January 2, 1990, p.14, see 
Appendix A). 
In affirming Judge Christensen1s ruling the reviewing court 
correctly gave deference to the learned trial judge. 
In situations where the exercise of discretion is 
appropriate, considerable weight should be given to the 
determination of the trial court, whichever way it goes. 
This is true because due to his close involvement with 
the parties, the witnesses, and the total circumstances 
of the case, he is in the best position to judge what the 
interests of justice require in safeguarding the rights 
and interests of all parties concerned. Barber v. 
Calder, 522 P.2d 700, 702 (Utah 1974). 
Petitioners claim that they had no opportunity to put on 
evidence to show that the April contract should not involve 
Hernandez and Gardner but only Dinero Services Inc. They argue 
that Judge Christensen1s ruling prior to trial was unfair and an 
abuse of discretion. But Judge Christensen had close involvement 
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with the parties prior to trial and heard numerous pretrial 
motions. At the beginning of the trial he had heard enough in 
order to confidently rule that Hernandez and Gardner were the real 
parties involved in the contract. The fact that he had heard 
arguments and received evidence regarding the issue in question is 
evidenced throughout the record. In Petitioners own Memorandum in 
Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss petitioners state: 
These defendants have earlier argued to the Court that 
the proper defendant to an action on the April 14, 1980 
Agreement is Dinero Services. Certainly, an action 
against Dinero Services, a new party, would not relate 
back to the original filing of this Complaint under Rule 
15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court 
has already ruled against these defendants on that issue, 
concluding that defendant Hernandez and Gardner are the 
real parties in interest. These defendants will not 
attempt to reargue that ruling. (Petitioners Memorandum 
in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, p. 2, see 
Appendix C, Exhibit 1, (emphasis added). 
In a ruling previous to trial signed by Judge Christensen 
and dated September 2, 198 6, Judge Christensen wrote: 
This matter comes before the Court, under Rule 2.8, on 
the motions of various parties seeking relief as 
hereinafter indicated. The Court has reviewed the file, 
considered the memoranda of counsel, entertained argument 
of counsel, and upon being advised in the premises, now 
makes the following ruling: . . . Said motion is denied 
as to Plaintiffs Poggio and Foreign Auto Works. While 
it is conceded by Said Defendants Gardner and Hernandez 
that such Defendants were the actual parties to the 
agreement of April 14, 1980 the Court is of the opinion 
that a legitimate question of fact remains as to whether 
or not Plaintiff signed the April 14, 1980, agreement 
under duress. (Ruling, In the Fourth Judicial District 
Court Utah County, State of Utah, September 2, 198 6, see 
Appendix C, Exhibit 2)(emphasis added). 
Other pretrial memoranda suggests that Judge Christensen had 
dealt with the issue numerous times. In petitioners Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgement dated June 27,1986 
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petitioners list as one of their uncontroverted facts. 
Although the named parties to the February Agreement were 
"Foreign Auto Works, Inc.11 and "Dinero Services, Inc.,11 
the actual parties were in fact Poggio, Gardner and 
Hernandez, and Poggio testified that he believed that he 
was at all times dealing with the same party. (Memorandum 
in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgement, June 
27, 1986, p.4, no. 9, see Appendix C, Exhibit 3). 
In the same motion petitioners reaffirm the fact that the parties 
were dealing with each other as individuals and that the real 
parties were Poggio, Hernandez and Gardner. 
In this case, there are four separate agreements between 
the same parties, all of which deal exclusively with the 
sale and purchase of FAW. Each of the agreements 
executed subsequent to the November Agreement resulted 
directly from disputes between the parties, and 
constituted an effort to resolve those disagreements. 
(Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgement, June 27, 1986, p.7,8, see Appendix C, Exhibit 
3). 
Finally in a memorandum filed in July 1986 petitioners again talk 
about all four of the agreements as being between the same parties. 
With respect to plaintifffs first argument, the evidence 
is uncontroverted that the individuals involved in all 
of the contracts were identical, and that all of them 
believed that they were dealing with the same parties at 
all times. (Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment, July 18, 1986, p. 4, see 
Appendix C, Exhibit 4). 
Judge Christensen heard arguments and received evidence on the 
matter many times before trial. Because he heard arguments prior 
to trial he was able to confidently begin the trial with a ruling 
on the matter. This allowed the court to save time bv not 
rearguing an issue that had been argued and decided previous to 
trial. The procedure followed by Judge Christensen is not an abuse 
of discretion nor is it contrary to Rule 43, the basis upon which 
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petitioners rely for this court's jurisdiction to review. Judge 
Christensen1s actions did not depart from the accepted and usual 
course of judicial proceedings and consequently do not call for 
the supervision of the Supreme Court. | Both parties had an 
opportunity prior to trial to present, brief and argue their 
position. Petitioners cannot now assert that they had no 
opportunity to present evidence on the matter. There was no abuse 
of discretion. 
II. Petitioners reliance upon rule 43(3), Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court in order to invoke a review by this Court is 
unfounded. The Appeals Court enunciated the "Colman test" and 
listed reasons for its decision, consequently petition for 
certiorari should be denied. 
Rule 43(3) reads as follows: 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, 
but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only when 
there are special and important reasons therefor. The 
following, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring 
the court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons 
that will be considered: 
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered 
a decision that has so far departed from the accepted and 
usual course of judicial proceedings or has so far 
sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call 
for an exercise of this court's power of supervision; 
(Rule 43, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court). 
The decision by the Utah Appeals Court does not depart from 
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings. The Appeals 
Court reviewed the lower court decision, articulated the correct 
standard for determining whether to pierce the corporate veil and 
expressed reasons for affirming the trial courts decision in 
regards to Hernandez1 and Gardner's claim. 
The opinion handed down by the Court of Appeals devotes an 
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entire section to a discussion of whether the trial court was 
correct in piercing the corporate veil. The Appeals court cited 
the test set forth in Colman v. Colman, 743 P. 2d 782 (Utah App. 
1987). The court explained, 
In order to disregard the corporate entity, two 
circumstances must be shown: (1) such a unity of 
interest and ownership that the separate personalities 
of the corporation and the individual no longer exist, 
but of one or a few individuals; and (2) if observed, the 
corporate from would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, 
or result in an inequity. (Opinion (for Publication), 
p. 14, January 2, 1990, Utah Court of Appeals, citing 
Colman v. Colman at 786). 
The Court of Appeals went on to say, "At the beginning of 
trial, the court stated that Gardner and Hernandez were personally 
liable under the April agreement and the trial proceeded with that 
ruling in place.11 (Opinion (for Publication), p.14, January 2, 
1990, Utah Court of Appeals). The above statement reaffirms that 
the trial court obviously had heard enough evidence in pretrial 
motions to make the ruling, petitioners argue that the above quote 
is all the analysis used by the Appeals court to affirm the 
decision. What they neglect to point out is that the Appeals court 
went on to say, 
These findings are supported by the evidence, especially 
considering the history of transactions in this matter, 
and met the required legal criteria for piercing the 
corporate veil. Therefore, the court did not err in 
holding Gardner and Hernandez personally liable to Poggio 
under the April agreement. Id., (emphasis added). 
The appeals court recognized as did the trial court that 
Poggio, Hernandez and Gardner were dealing with each other and not 
as corporate entities. The first two agreements were negotiated 
between Poggio, Hernandez and Gardner. The second two agreements 
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were negotiated between Poggio, Hernandez and Gardner. The only-
difference between the first two agreements and the second two 
agreements was that the name Dinero Services was typed on the 
agreements. As the Appeals Court explained, the trial courtfs 
findings were supported by evidence, showirlg that the history of 
the matter revealed that the parties dealt with each other as 
individuals throughout their negotiations. 
Conclusion 
This court should not grant certiorari in this matter. Both 
parties had the opportunity to present evidence, file briefs and 
argue their position in pretrial motions. Judge Christensen after 
considering the evidence, memorandums and arguments made his 
decision. The Appeals Court giving deference to the trial judge 
affirmed his decision. 
This situation is not within the scope of Rule 43, Rules of 
the Utah Supreme Court. The Appeals Court has not "departed from 
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings'1 nor have 
they "sanctioned such a departure by a lowqr court as to call for 
an exercise of this court's power of supervision." (Rule 43, Rules 
of the Utah Supreme Court). The appeals court enunciated the 
standard for piercing the corporate veil and applying that standard 
stated that the history of the transactions coupled with other 
evidence relied upon by the trial court was enough to meet the 
test. 
After hearing evidence Judge Christensen determined that, 
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Poggio, Hernandez and Gardner were dealing with each other 
individually and not as corporate entities. The Court of Appeals 
was correct in affirming this decision. Therefore, this court 
should deny petitioner's petition for writ of certiorari. 
Dated this W day of April, 1990. 
'iJ^fr^ 
Lynn C. Harris and Jeril B. Wilson 
Attorneys for Respondents 
Poggio and FAW 
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F I L E D 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
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M ^ „ *<>'*>• Court 
t»^(Diurt.#f AppM |S . 
Richard W. Ringwood, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Foreign Auto Works, Inc. and 
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Poggio, Rebecca Jane Poggio, 
Anthony Hernandez and Hugh 
Gardner, 
Defendants and Respondents 
Massimo "Mai" Poggio and 
Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 
Plaintiffs, 
v, 
Hugh Gardner and Anthony R. 
Hernandez, 
Defendants. 
Richard W. Ringwood, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Foreign Auto Works, Inc. et 
al., 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Massimo "Max" Poggio and 
Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v, 
Hugh Gardner and Anthony R. 
Hernandez, 
Defendants and Respondents, 
Richard W. Ringwood, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Foreign Auto Works, Inc. et 
al., 
Defendants and Respondents 
Massimo "Max" Poggio and 
Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
Hugh Gardner and Anthony R. 
Hernandez, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 870540-CA 
Case No. 870541-CA 
Case No. 870544-CA 
Fourth District/ Utah County 
The Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen 
Attorneys: Dallas H. Young/ Jr.# Jerry Reynolds, Provo/ for 
Appellant and Respondent Ringwood 
Val R. Antczak/ Julia C. Attwood/ Salt Lake City, 
for Appellants and Respondents Gardner & 
Hernandez 
Robert C. Fillerup/ Orem/ for Appellant and 
Respondent Francis 
Lynn C. Harris, Jeril B. Wilson/ ProvO/ for 
Appellants and Respondents Poggio and Foreign 
Auto Works 
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood/ and Orme. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
This appeal arises from the sale of Foreign Auto Works/ 
Inc. (FAW), an auto sales and service business• Richard W. 
Ringwood (Ringwood)/ Howard R. Francis (Francis)/ and Rebecca 
Jane and Massimo -Max" Poggio (Poggio) were the owners of all 
the issued FAW stock. Ringwood agreed to sell his stock to 
Poggio and Francis. Poggio subsequently bought Francis's stock 
and sold FAW to Hugh Gardner (Gardner) and Anthony R. Hernandez 
(Hernandez). Ringwood brought an action against Francis and 
Poggio for breach of contract and against Hernandez and 
Gardner, claiming to be a third party beneficiary of their 
contract with Poggio. Poggio filed a separate action for 
breach of contract against Gardner and Hernandez. The two 
actions were consolidated and tried together. The court found 
Francis and Poggio liable for breach of their agreement with 
Ringwood, but dismissed Ringwood1s claim against Hernandez and 
Gardner. The court also rendered judgment for Poggio against 
Gardner and Hernandez. Hernandez and Gardner's counterclaim 
against Poggio and FAW was dismissed with prejudice. All 
parties appealed. 
FACTS 
Ringwood, Francis, and Poggio were owners of all the FAW 
issued stock, 50,000 shares. FAW was engaged in operating 
Mazda and Fiat franchises and selling parts for and repairing 
Mazdas and Fiats, 
In October 1978, the owners negotiated a sale of Ringwood*s 
15,000 shares to Francis and Poggio. This agreement was 
formalized in a promissory note obligating FAW, Poggio, and 
Francis to pay Ringwood $100,000 at a rate of at least $20,000 
per year with interest to accrue at 10.5% annually. On 
November 8, 1978, FAW, Ringwood, Francis, and Poggio executed a 
new agreement that included most of the same terms as in the 
promissory note, but also contained a merger provision. This 
agreement prohibited Francis and Poggio from selling the stock 
or assets of FAW without Ringwood's prior written approval. By 
October 1979, Francis and Poggio were delinquent in their 
payments to Ringwood. Poggio then purchased all of Francis's 
shares and became the sole owner. 
On November 27, 1979, Poggio contracted to sell the FAW 
stock to Gardner and Hernandez. The same parties executed a 
new agreement on December 29, 1979, which excluded the sale of 
FAW's real property. Both agreements included provisions for 
full payment to Ringwood and specified 10.5% per annum interest 
on amounts to be paid to Poggio. 
On February 8, 1980, a new agreement was again executed 
changing the transaction from a sale of FAW stock to a sale of 
FAW's assets. No interest rate on the purchase price was 
specified. Dinero Services, Inc., (Dinero) a corporation 
formed and owned by Hernandez and Gardner, was designated as 
the sole buyer. This agreement did not contain any provision 
for the buyer to assume Poggio's obligation to Ringwood. 
In April 1980, Poggio and Dinero Services, Inc. executed 
their final agreement. This agreement was executed because a 
condition precedent in the February contract had not occurred 
and a dispute had arisen over the assets' value - It contained 
an indemnity agreement that required Poggio to indemnify the 
"sellerH [sic] for any amounts Dinero might be required to pay 
Ringwood, including attorney fees. Again, no interest rate was 
set forth. 
Ringwood had filed a prior lawsuit on January 29, 1980, 
claiming Poggio and Francis had breached the October 1978 
promissory note. Because Ringwood did not base his claim on 
the November 8 agreement, which the court found controlling, 
the court dismissed Ringwood's claim with prejudice. This 
decision was affirmed in Rinawood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 
671 P.2d 182 (Utah 1983). 
Ringwood filed the complaint leading to this appeal on 
February 4, 1985, basing his claim against Poggio and Francis 
on the November 8 agreement. Ringwood included Gardner and 
Hernandez as defendants, claiming he was a third party 
beneficiary of their agreement with Poggio and that he was 
damaged by their breach of that agreement. Ringwood claimed 
Poggio and Francis failed to make payments required by the 
November agreement; that they breached the agreement by selling 
FAW's assets; and that they acted with malicious intent to 
deprive Ringwood of his interests. 
Poggio then filed a complaint against Gardner and Hernandez 
for breach of their November 27, 1979 agreement. After the 
court found the April 1980 agreement was controlling, Poggio 
amended his complaint, basing his claims on the April agreement. 
The court found that res judicata did not bar Ringwood and 
that Poggio and Francis were liable to Ringwood for breach, but 
that there was no malicious intent. The court also awarded 
Poggio judgment against Hernandez and Gardner personally, 
rather than against Dinero, with interest to accrue at the 
legal rate, finding that the controlling contract did not 
specify an interest rate. The court allocated expense and 
income damages from April 14, 1980, the date of the closing, 
instead of February, when Hernandez and Gardner took possession 
Of FAW. 
With respect to Ringwood's claims against Gardner and 
Hernandez, the court found Ringwood was not a third party 
beneficiary but only an incidental beneficiary under the 
controlling agreement, and dismissed the claim with prejudice. 
The trial court also found there was insufficient evidence to 
find that Poggio or FAW was insolvent when the contract with 
Hernandez and Gardner was entered into. 
Ringwood appeals the court's finding that he is not a third 
party beneficiary. He argues further that the April 14 
agreement could not release Gardner and Hernandez from their 
obligation to him. 
Poggio appeals the court's ruling that Ringwood's claim was 
not barred by res judicata and that interest would accrue on 
his judgment against Gardner and Hernandez at the legal rate. 
Also, with respect to the court's finding on allocation of 
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income and expense damages, Poggio argues he should be liable 
for those damages only to February 8/ 1980/ when Gardner and 
Hernadez took control of FAW, not April 14, 1980, the closing 
date specified in the last agreement. 
Gardner and Hernandez claim the court erred in finding that 
Poggio's amended complaint relates back to his original 
complaint, thus allowing Poggio to bring a claim six years 
after the initial breach on August 8/ 1980/ after expiration of 
the applicable statute of limitations. 
The court denied Gardner and Hernandez attorney fees 
because there was no showing of the necessity or reasonableness 
of the fees requested. Gardner and Hernandez claim on appeal 
that a showing of reasonableness is unnecessary under an 
indemnity agreement. 
RINGWOODfS CLAIMS 
Ringwood raises two arguments on appeal. First/ he claims 
the court erred in finding he was not a third party 
beneficiary# but only an incidental beneficiary of the contract 
between Poggio and Gardner and Hernandez. Second, in related 
arguments, Ringwood urges that Poggio*s release of Gardner and 
Hernandez from their obligation to pay him was ineffective 
because (1) he had vested rights by virtue of Gardner and 
Hernandez*s exercise of control over FAW/ (2) Poggio was 
insolvent at the time of the release/ and (3) there was not 
fair consideration for the April agreement. 
Third Party Beneficiary 
The court found that Ringwood was an intended third party 
beneficiary under the first two contracts between Poggio and 
Gardner and Hernandez, but that Ringwood did not rely upon, 
assent tO/ nor file an action based on either of those 
contracts prior to the time they were superceded by the 
February and April 1980 agreements. The court further found 
that Ringwood was intended to be an incidental beneficiary only 
of the February 8/ 1980 and April 14/ 1980 agreements. 
"Generally/ the rights of a third-party beneficiary are 
determined by the intentions of the parties to the subject 
contract.- Tracv Collins Bank & Trust v. Dickamore, 652 P.2d 
1314/ 1315 (Utah 1982). Moreover/ "[f]or a third-party 
beneficiary to have a right to enforce a right/ the intention 
of the contracting parties to confer a separate and distinct 
benefit upon the third party must be clear,- Hansen v. Green 
River Group, 748 P.2d 1102, 1105 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (quoting 
Rio Alcorn Corp, v. Jimco Ltd.. 618 P*2d 497, 506 (Utah 1980)). 
An incidental beneficiary is defined as a -person who will be 
benefited by the performance of a contract in which he is not a 
promisee, but whose relation to the contracting parties is such 
that the courts will not recognize any legal right in him.-
Schwinghammer v. Alexander, 21 Utah 2d 418, 446 P.2d 414, 415 
(1968). 
In this case, the contracts of November and December 
expressly obligated Gardner and Hernandez to assume Poggio's 
obligation to Ringwood. However, these agreements were 
superceded by the February agreement and ultimately by the 
April agreement, both of which lacked any requirement that 
Gardner and Hernandez assume the obligation to Ringwood, but 
explicitly obligated Poggio to satisfy the obligation. • Because 
Gardner and Hernandez did not expressly assume the obligation 
as they had in the earlier agreements, and because Poggio 
expressly agreed to satisfy his obligation to Ringwood, it is 
clear that the parties no longer intended Ringwood as a third 
party beneficiary. Gardner and Hernandez have cited the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts for the proposition that 
parties may modify duties to a third party beneficiary under 
some circumstances, as follows: 
(1) Discharge or modification of a 
duty to an intended beneficiary by conduct 
of the promisee or by a subsequent 
agreement between promisor and promisee is 
ineffective if a terra of the promise 
creating the duty so provides. 
(2) In the absence of such a term, the 
promisor and promisee retain power to 
discharge or modify the duty bv subsequent 
ggrggmentt 
(3) Such a power terminates when the 
beneficiary, before he receives 
notification of the discharge or 
modification, materially changes his 
position in justifiable reliance on the 
promise or brings suit on it or manifests 
assent to it at the request of the 
promisor or promisee. 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 311 (1981) (emphasis 
added). Although no Utah cases have expressly adopted this 
language, we find it applicable to the facts of this case. As 
found by the trial court, Ringwood did not rely upon nor change 
his position because of the rights as a third party beneficiary 
afforded him in the first two contracts/ nor did he file an 
action based on those rights. Therefore, the parties were free 
to terminate Ringwood's rights in the later, superceding 
contracts. The April agreement clearly does not give Ringwood 
third party beneficiary status. As a result, the trial court 
did not err in concluding Ringwood was not a third party 
beneficiary to the April agreement. 
Fraudulent Release 
Ringwood also argues that the rescission of his rights 
under the earlier agreements was fraudulent and, therefore, 
invalid, because Poggio did not receive fair consideration for 
the release and because Poggio was insolvent. To support his 
contention, Ringwood primarily relies on the Second Restatement 
on Contracts, which states, -a promise for the benefit of a 
creditor of the promisee is an asset of the promisee, A 
release of the promisor may be a fraud on the beneficiary or on 
other creditors of the promisee if the promisee is insolvent 
and the release is made without fair consideration . . . ." 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 311 comment i (1981). 
The court's findings state that there was insufficient 
evidence to find that either Poggio or FAW was insolvent. The 
court also found that there was fair consideration for the 
April 1980 agreement. We review the trial court's findings in 
accordance with Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a), and will not reverse 
unless the findings are clearly erroneous. 
Evidence was presented as to Poggio's debts, including tax 
debts and the amounts owed to Ringwood. However, no evidence 
was admitted concerning the value of FAW, retained by Poggio 
under the agreements, nor of the Fiat franchise, which he 
retained until 1982. Poggio also testified that he owned a 
painting, valued in excess of $100,000. No competent evidence 
was presented to invalidate that valuation. We find sufficient 
evidence to support the court's finding that Poggio's 
insolvency was not established. Similarly, the court's finding 
of fair consideration for the April 1980 agreement is supported 
by Poggio's testimony regarding amounts he was to receive under 
the agreement and as reflected in the agreement itself. 
Finally, Ringwood cites Bracklein v. Realty Ins, Co.. 95 
Utah 490, 80 P.2d 471 (1938) to support his novel theory that 
he had a vested third party interest because of Gardner and 
Hernandez's exercise of dominion and control over FAWs 
assets. Bracklein, however, concerns a grantee of mortgaged 
property who was in privity of contract with the mortgagee 
through an assumption clause. Ringwood was not in privity with 
Gardner and Hernandez and, therefore, Bracklein is 
inapplicable. Also, Gardner and Hernandez took possession of 
FAW after the February agreement was executed and after 
Ringwood's third party beneficiary rights had been 
extinguished. Therefore, Ringwood is not restored to third 
party rights by use of this theory. 
POGGIO'S CLAIMS 
On appeal, Poggio claims that the trial court erred (1) by 
concluding that Ringwood*s claims against him under the 
November 1978 agreement were not barred by res judicata; (2) in 
ruling that the legal rate of interest applied to the amount 
owed him by Gardner and Hernandez; and (3) allocating costs and 
expenses from the date of closing rather than from when Gardner 
and Hernandez took over FAW. 
Res Judicata 
Poggio claims the court incorrectly concluded that the 
doctrine of res judicata did not operate to preclude Ringwood's 
second complaint against him. Prior to analyzing the 
applicability of res judicata, however, we consider an 
evidentiary question raised by Ringwood. Ringwood asserts that 
there was no evidentiary basis for a determination that res 
judicata barred his action, because no evidence was offered or 
admitted as to the prior proceeding. We have examined the 
record, and determined that there are no exhibits in the trial 
court proceedings consisting of records of the prior 
litigation, nor were any requests for judicial notice of those 
proceedings made on the record. 
Ringwood cites the case of Parrish v. Lavton Citv Corp., 
542 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1975) as supporting his position. In 
Parrish, defendant claimed that plaintiffs action was barred 
by res judicata because a prior similar action had been 
dismissed. The trial court's grant of summary judgment to 
defendant was reversed by the Utah Supreme Court, stating that 
w[a] survey of the record reveals that defendant never 
submitted a copy of the pleadings and judgment- from the prior 
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action. 1£. at 1087, The court found that "[s]ince the record 
of the prior action was not before the trial court, there is no 
basis to sustain the determination that plaintiff's claim was 
barred by the doctrine of res judicata." I£. 
Application of Parrish was addressed by this court in 
Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, 758 P.2d 451 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988), cert, denied, 769 P.2d 819 (Utah 1988)• In a 
prior action, Trimble had sued Fitzgerald, a buyer, for a real 
estate commission. The trial court found against him and the 
supreme court affirmed the decision. Trimble then brought a 
second action for the same commission against Monte Vista 
Ranch, seller of the property, which raised the defense of res 
judicata. The trial court dismissed the action on the basis of 
res judicata and Trimble appealed. On appeal, Trimble, relying 
on Parrish, asked for reversal because the trial court did not 
have before it the records of the prior proceeding, but only 
the supreme court decision, which was attached to a memorandum 
in support of defendant's motion for summary judgment. The 
Trimble court found Parrish distinguishable, noting that in 
Parrish, the trial court had no record at all of the prior 
proceeding, and thus "had absolutely no basis for determining 
the res judicata issue." !£. at 455. The court further found 
that Trimble had consented to the trial court's reliance on the 
opinion and that 
once Monte Vista submitted to the district 
court a copy of the Supreme Court opinion, 
which on its face showed that the key 
issue had been litigated and decided, the 
burden shifted to Trimble, if it believed 
more than the opinion was needed to make a 
fully informed decision, to produce the 
record of the prior proceeding, urge the 
court to take judicial notice of it, or 
otherwise show that the opinion should not 
be taken at face value. 
X&. Trimble, however, had not taken any of those actions but 
had merely argued the meaning of the opinion in the prior 
action. L&. As a result, this court held that Trimble 
consented to the trial court's use of the opinion alone as a 
basis for its ruling. In addition, the trial court was able to 
infer from the opinion what had been adjudicated in the prior 
action and conclude that the present action was barred by 
collateral estoppel. Id. 
In this case, from our reading of the record, it is not 
clear whether or not the trial court actually examined the 
trial court proceedings in the former action,1 It is clear, 
however, that the trial court examined the supreme court 
opinion. Not only was it referred to in some detail in 
memoranda and motions of counsel, but was also detailed in the 
court's rulings, which demonstrate the court's familiarity with 
the opinion. Throughout the course of the trial court 
proceedings, counsel and the court referred to and argued the 
meaning of the supreme court opinion in the context of the res 
judicata claim. At no point did Ringwood object to reliance on 
the opinion or move for admission of the former action's trial 
court proceedings. Therefore, as in Trimble, there was no 
error in utilizing the opinion only to determine the 
applicability of res judicata. 
The next question is whether there needed to be explicit 
admission of the opinion into evidence or taking of judicial 
notice.2 Judicial notice serves as a substitute for the 
taking of evidence. 29 Am. Jur.2d Evidence § 14 (1967). 
Therefore, since the opinion was not admitted into evidence, it 
is sufficient if judicial notice was taken. Pursuant to Utah 
R. Evid. 201(c), the court has discretion to take judicial 
notice without request by counsel. In this case, the trial 
court reserved ruling on the res judicata issue until after the 
supreme court opinion was issued. Thereafter, it referred to 
the opinion in detail when rendering its decision and the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law entered include 
particulars from the opinion. It is clear that the trial court 
had carefully read the opinion and ruled on the res judicata 
issue on the basis of its interpretation of the opinion, with 
no objection by the parties. We, therefore, conclude that the 
court took judicial notice of the opinion and utilized the 
1. There are, however, indications that the court may have 
examined the proceedings. For example, the court said it 
wanted to look at the file of the former action when the 
supreme court was through with it, and at one point, counsel 
for Poggio stated he had the summons and complaint from the 
former action. 
2« Trimble does not address this question, although it appears 
that the supreme court opinion was neither admitted as evidence 
nor afforded official judicial notice on the record. 
opinion as the evidentiary basis for its decision on the issue 
of res judicata.3 
We now turn to the question of whether the trial court 
correctly concluded that Ringwood's claim under the November 8 
agreement against Poggio was not barred by res judicata. Claim 
preclusion is a branch of the doctrine of res judicata which 
has three requirements for its application!: 
First, both cases must involve the same 
parties or their privies. Second, the 
claim that is alleged to be barred must 
have been presented in the first suit or 
must be one that could and should have 
been raised in the first action. Third, 
the first suit must have resulted in a 
final judgment on the merits. 
Madsen v. Borthwick. 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988)^. Therefore, 
the result in the prior action-constitutes the full relief 
available to the parties on the same claim or cause of action. 
Trimble, 758 P.2d at 453. In contrast to the claim preclusion 
branch of res judicata, issue preclusion, or collateral 
estoppel, requires that the issue in question was competently, 
fully, and fairly litigated in the earlier action. Copper 
State Thrift & Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987) . Claim preclusion applicability, however, requires that 
the claim, even though not decided in the prior action, could 
and should have been litigated, but was not raised by any of 
the parties. See Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 627 P.2d 528 (Utah 
1981). This -reflects the expectation that parties who are 
given the capacity to present their "entire controversies' 
shall in fact do so." Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 
comment a (1982). 
The findings of the trial court in this case indicate that, 
in the prior action, the trial court ruled that the October 
promissory note merged into the November 8 agreement and that 
ruling was affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court. The trial court 
herein concluded that the prior decision was "not a decision on 
3. We note, however, as does Trimble, that it would be 
preferable for counsel to have provided a copy of the trial 
court proceedings and the supreme court opinion, and either had 
them admitted as exhibits or requested judicial notice. 
the merits of Ringwood's claims for the sale of his stock and 
such decision is not res judicata so as to preclude Ringwood 
from pursuing claims under the Agreement of November 8, 1979." 
We do not defer to the trial court's conclusions of law, and in 
this case, find that the court erred in concluding that res 
judicata did not bar Ringwood's claim against Poggio. Both the 
October promissory note and the November agreement concerned 
Poggio's purchase of Ringwood's stock*4 The court in the 
prior action determined that the October note was nullified by 
merger into the November agreement so that Ringwood could not 
assert a claim under the October note. Since Ringwood failed 
to assert a claim under the November agreement either initially 
or by amendment to his complaint, the case was properly 
dismissed. Obviously, a claim by Ringwood under the November 
agreement could have been decided in the prior action, as the 
agreement was extant and was in default. The only reason it 
was not decided was because Ringwood failed to raise the 
claim. The trial court apparently held that res judicata did 
not apply because Ringwood's claim for payment for his stock 
under the November agreement was not litigated. However, the 
reason the claim was not litigated was solely because of 
Ringwood's failure to assert the claim. The other requirements 
of res judicata are also met, as the parties are the same and 
the first action resulted in a final judgment on the 
merits.5 Therefore, we find that res judicata bars 
Ringwood's claims against Poggio and Francis, and reverse the 
judgment granted Ringwood. 
Legal Rate of Interest 
Poggio appeals the court's application of the then legal 
rate of interest, 6%, to the balance of the purchase price owed 
by Gardner and Hernandez. Poggio admits that the April 
agreement is silent on the interest rate, but contends, 
4. The supreme court opinion states: "In 1978, Mr. Ringwood 
and FAW agreed with the defendants, Mr. and Mrs. Poggio and Mr. 
Francis, that the defendants would purchase Ringwood's shares 
for $100,000, and the defendants signed a promissory note in 
October, 1978 for that amount. Subsequently, on November 8, 
1978 the parties entered into a written agreement for the sale 
and purchase of the stock." Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, 
Inc., 671 P.2d 182, 182 (Utah 1983). 
5. The fact that the prior action was dismissed with prejudice 
does not nullify res judicata application, as such constitutes 
litigation on the merits. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Steiner v. 
State, 27 Utah 2d 284, 495 P.2d 809 (1972). 
however/ the interest rate should be inferred to be 10.5% as 
was specified in the previous agreements that were superceded. 
Poggio presented no evidence at trial of an intent to 
incorporate a 10.5% interest rate into the April agreement. 
The court found that the parties intended the April agreement 
to supercede and replace all prior agreements. We defer to the 
trial court's findings as to the parties' intentions. 
Seashores Inc. v. Hancev, 738 P.2d 645/ 647 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). The court's finding is supported by substantial 
evidence. Furthermore, the prior agreements merged into the 
April agreement which clearly does not specify an interest 
rate. Utah law provides that the legal rate is applicable in 
instances where the parties have not agreed on a specified 
rate. Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 (1986). We, therefore, conclude 
that the court did not err in awarding interest at the legal 
rate on Poggio's judgment against Gardner and Hernandez. 
Allocation of Income and Expense Liability 
Lastly# Poggio appeals the trial court's allocation of 
income and expense damages as of the date of closing rather 
than the earlier date when Gardner and Hernandez took 
possession of FAW. This issue was not raised in the trial 
court and/ hence/ cannot be considered for the first time on 
appeal. Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320/ 1322-23 (Utah 1982); 
James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
GARDNER AND HERNANDEZ'S CLAIMS 
Gardner and Hernandez contend the trial court erred (1) by 
finding them personally liable under the April agreement; (2) 
in ruling that Poggio's amended complaint related back to his 
original complaint; (3) in its calculation of the amount owed 
by them to Poggio; and (4) in denying them attorney fees. 
Personal Liability 
Gardner and Hernandez appeal the trial court's conclusion 
that they are personally liable under the April agreement. 
They argue that the court ignored the corporate form without 
finding Dinero was their alter ego and/ consequently, 
unjustifiably pierced the corporate veil. 
The corporate form protects shareholders from personal 
liability and will be pierced by the courts with great 
reluctance and caution. Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 786 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). In order to disregard the corporate 
entity, 
two circumstances must be shown: (1) such 
a unity of interest and ownership that the 
separate personalities of the corporation 
and the individual no longer exist, but 
the corporation is, instead, the alter-ego 
of one or a few individuals; and (2) if 
observed, the corporate form would 
sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or 
result in an inequity* 
I£. &££ 9lSQ Salt Lake Citv Corp. v. James Constructors, 761 
P.2d 42, 46 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). One of the factors deemed 
significant in determining whether this test has been met is 
the use of the corporation as a facade for operations of the 
dominant stockholder. Colman, 743 P.2d at 786. it At the 
beginning of trial, the court stated that Gardner and Hernandez 
were personally liable under the April agreement and the trial 
proceeded with that ruling in place.(/ The court found that 
Gardner and Hernandez were the real parties in interest, that 
they were intended as parties to the agreement, and that 
"Dinero Services Inc. was not considered by the parties as an 
operative entity as far as the dealings between the parties 
were concerned." These findings are supported by the evidence, 
especially considering the history of transactions in this 
matter, and meet the required legal criteria for piercing the 
corporate veil. Therefore, the court did not err in holding 
Gardner and Hernandez personally liable to Poggio under the 
April agreement. 
Relation Back 
Gardner and Hernandez appeal the court's conclusion that 
Poggio's amendment to the complaint, filed on October 16, 1986, 
relates back to his original complaint, filed on May 3, 1982, 
and was, thus, not barred by the statute of limitations. 
Poggio's last amended complaint was for the purpose of basing 
his claim against Gardner and Hernandez on the April 
agreement. Gardner and Hernandez argue that the earlier 
pleadings did not place them on notice that Poggio would base 
his action for breach of contract on the April agreement. 
Under Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a), leave to amend pleadings 
"shall be freely given when justice so requires.- Utah R. Civ. 
P. 15(c) states, "[w]henever the claim or defense asserted in 
the amended pleading arose out of the conduct/ transaction, or 
occurrence, set forth or attempted to be set forth in the 
original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of 
the original pleading,- Relation back is allowed under the 
rules even if a statute of limitations has run during the 
intervening time. Mevers v. Interwest Corp., 632 P.2d 879 
(Utah 1981). In considering motions to amend pleadings, 
primary considerations are whether parties have adequate notice 
to meet new issues and whether any party receives an unfair 
advantage or disadvantage. Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d 94, 98 
(Utah 1981). SfiS also Vina v. Jefferson Ins. Co., 761 P.2d 
581, 587 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
In this case, Poggio's claim in his amended complaint is 
based on essentially the same transaction as was the original 
complaint: the purchase of FAW and/or its assets by Gardner 
and Hernandez and their alleged failure to perform under the 
operative contract between the parties. In addition, Gardner 
and Hernandez asserted repeatedly in the trial court 
proceedings, that the agreements under which Poggio had 
previously sought to recover had been superceded and filed a 
memorandum in support of a motion for partial summary judgment 
against Poggio, arguing the April agreement was controlling. 
This memorandum was filed three months before Poggio filed his 
amendment. Because the amendment was based on a similar claim 
arising out of the same general transaction, and because 
Gardner and Hernandez were aware, within the period of the 
statute, that the April agreement was superceding, Gardner and 
Hernandez had adequate notice of the claim and were not 
prejudiced by the amendment. The subject matter of the April 
agreement arose from the same basic dealings as the prior 
agreements between the same parties and the amendment alleging 
breach of the April agreement related back to the original 
filing and was not barred by the statute of limitations. 
Therefore, the court did not err in concluding that the 
amendment related back. 
Amount of Liability to Poggio 
Gardner and Hernandez claim the court erred in determining 
the amount owed Poggio, Specifically, they claim the court 
erred in calculating the amount they actually paid under the 
April agreement. Gardner testified that he actually overpaid 
approximately $12,000. To the contrary, Poggio testified that 
there was still an outstanding balance. Based on this 
testimony and other evidence, the court granted judgment to 
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Poggio for $20,330.27, as the balance owed on the purchase price. 
-Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. . . .H 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). Particularly, the court's award of 
damages will be affirmed on appeal, "if there is a reasonable 
basis in evidence- to support it. Holman v. Sorenson, 556 P.2d 
499, 500 (Utah 1976); Gillmor v. Gillmor. 745 P.2d 461, 462 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988); 
Katzenbach v. State. 735 P.2d 405, 409 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Moreover, -[t]he trial court as a trier of fact is free to assess 
the credibility of the witnesses, and a conflict in evidence 
alone is not grounds for reversal. We will not upset findings, 
so long as they are supported by substantial record evidence." 
Chandler v. Mathews, 734 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah 1987). Although 
evidence of the amount actually paid was conflicting, the trial 
court's finding is based on substantial evidence and is not 
clearly erroneous. 
Attorney Fees 
Finally, Gardner and Hernandez appeal the court's denial of 
attorney fees. The April agreement provided that Poggio would 
indemnify Dinero -from any and all claims and loss . . . 
including attoneys* fees* arising from claims made by Ringwood. 
Gardner's testimony that $6500 in attorney fees had been paid to 
defend against Ringwoodfs claims was the sole evidence offered to 
support the claim for 3ttorney fees. The trial court denied the 
request for fees on the basis that there was no evidence 
presented to show that the fees were reasonable or necessary, or 
the nature of the work done. Gardner and Hernandez argue such 
evidence is unnecessary because the request is made pursuant to 
an indemnity agreement and not an attorney fees clause. To 
support this argument, they cite Heritage v. Pioneer Brokerage & 
Sales, Inc., 604 P.2d 1059 (Alaska.1978). However, in Heritage, 
the Alaska Supreme Court found attorney fees were recoverable as 
falling within an implied right of indemnification clause, but 
did not hold that there was no requirement of a showing that the 
fees were reasonable. We see no basis for distinguishing a 
request for attorney fees under an indemnity provision from a 
request under an attorney fee provision. -Attorney fees awarded 
pursuant to contract or statute are usually those found by the 
court to be 'reasonable,' unless the statute or contract provides 
otherwise.- Canvon Country Store v. Bracev, 781 P.2d 414, 420 
(Utah 1989). Furthermore, -[i]t is well established that to 
justify a finding of a reasonable attorney's fee, there must be 
evidence in support of that finding. . . . It is beyond 
dispute that an evidentiary basis is a fundamental requirement 
for establishing an award of attorney fees.- Barnes v. Wood, 
750 P.2d 1226, 1233 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (quoting Paul Mueller 
Co. v. Cache Vallev Dairy Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1279, 1287 (Utah 
1982)). The trial court was, therefore/ correct in denying the 
request because there was no showing the fees requested were 
reasonable. 
Affirmed in part, and reversed as to the judgment entered 
in f>*3>r of Ringwood against PqcKjio. 
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M. BILLINGS, and GREGORY K. ORME, Judges, concur. 
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I hereby certify that on the 2nd day of January, 1990, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing OPINION was deposited in the United 
States mail or personally delivered to each of the above parties. 
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DALLAS E. YOUNG, JR. 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Ringwood 
P. 0. Box 6 72 
48 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: 375-3000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD W. RINGWOOD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FOREIGN AUTO WORKS, INC., at al., 
Defendants. 
MASSIMO "MAX" POGGIO and 
FOREIGN AUTO WORKS, INC., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
HUGH GARDNER and ANTHONY 
R. HERNANDEZ, 
Civil No. 60,654 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW 
Civil No. 65,314 
Defendants. 
1. On November 8, 1978 Richard W. Ringwood (Ringwood), 
Howard R. Francis (Francis), and Massimo "Max" Poggio (Poggio) 
were the owners of all of the stock, 50,000 shares, of a Utah 
corporation known as Foreign Auto Works (FAW). 
2. FAW operated businesses at two different locations. One 
business was located at 235 West 300 South in Provo and one was 
located at 130 South State Street in Orem. The activity at 235 
West 300 South consisted principally of repairing automobiles and 
.  s e l l i n g p a r t s for automobi les manufactured out of the United 
S t a t e s . FAW owned two r e t a i l automobile f r a n c h i s e s . The franchises 
au tho r i zed FAW to s e l l and s e r v i c e new Mazda and F i a t automobi les . 
The Mazda and F ia t r e t a i l b u s i n e s s e s were l oca t ed in Orem a t 136 
South S t a t e S t r e e t . 
3. On November 8, 1978 FAWf Ringwood, F r a n c i s , and Poggio 
executed a w r i t t e n agreement , (" the November 8 agreement" ) . That 
w r i t t e n agreement i s inc luded as p a r t of the p l a i n t i f f ' s Exhibi t 
3 and i s incorpora ted by r e f e r e n c e in these F indings of Fac t . 
4. On November 8, 1978, Ringwood owned 15,000 sha re s of 
s t o c k in FAW. Poggio and F r a n c i s owned the remaining 35,000 
s h a r e s . FAW, by the terms of the November 8 agreement , agreed to 
purchase Ringwoodfs s h a r e s and pay him $100,000.00 for h i s 15,000 
s h a r e s . F ranc i s and Poggio and Poggio 1s wife Rebecca Jane 
Pogg io , each p e r s o n a l l y guaranteed the performance of FAW. The 
purchase p r i c e was to be paid as fo l l ows : 
( 3 ) . Buyer ag rees to pay monthly the sum of $1,000.00 
to be app l ied toward the p r i n c i p a l p lus such a d d i t i o n a l 
sums r e p r e s e n t i n g monthly accrued i n t e r e s t . The monthly 
payments to be app l i ed toward p r i n c i p a l dur ing any twelve 
month per iod s h a l l t o t a l not l e s s than $20 ,000 .00 , and 
t h e r e f o r e , Buyer a g r e e s to pay such a d d i t i o n a l sums 
necessa ry to reduce the p r i n c i p a l of the face amount 
of t h i s no te by $20,000.00 per each twelve month per iod 
from October 1, 1978. 
5* Paragraph 7 of the November 8 agreement r e a d s as f o l l o w s : 
Buyer and b u y e r ' s s h a r e h o l d e r s , d i r e c t o r s and o f f i c e r s 
agree t h a t dur ing the per iod for which an o u t s t a n d i n g 
balance of the purchase p r i c e remains , they s h a l l not 
d i spose of, t r a n s f e r , or encumber any of such s h a r e s of 
s tock wi thout the p r i o r w r i t t e n approva l of the s e l l e r , nor 
they s h a l l , [ s i c ] dur ing t h i s p e r i o d , vo te for any of 
the following wi thout the p r i o r w r i t t e n approval of the 
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s e l l e r : 
R e c a p i t a l i z a t i o n , r e o r g a n i z a t i o n , merger, or d i s s o l u t i o n of 
the c o r p o r a t i o n , or the s a l e , exchange, or mortgage of any 
p rope r ty o r f r anch i se s of the c o r p o r a t i o n , except as to 
t r a n s a c t i o n s in the r e g u l a r course of the bus iness of the 
c o r p o r a t i o n ; or the amendment of the c e r t i f i c a t e of incorpo-
r a t i o n with r e s p e c t to the r i g h t s of the s h a r e h o l d e r s . 
6. The note r e f e r r e d to by paragraph (3) of the November 8 
agreement was a promissory note dated October 1, 1978, which 
promissory note was the s u b j e c t of C i v i l Action No. 53,579 
in the above e n t i t l e d c o u r t . 
7. The October 1, 1978 promissory note was one by the terms 
of which F r a n c i s and Poggio agreed to p^y the sum of $100,000 to 
t h e o rde r of Ringwood. Payments were to be in the amount of 
$1,000 per month, i n t e r e s t a t the r a t e of 10-1/2% and p r i n c i p a l 
was to be reduced in a t l e a s t the amount of $20,000 per yea r . 
8. This c o u r t , Judge Al len B. Sorensen p r e s i d i n g , found in 
C i v i l No. 53,579 in F indings of Fact and Judgment dated the 8th 
day of March, 1982, t h a t the promissory note of October 1 , 1978 
was merged i n t o the November 8 agreement . In t h a t case the cour t 
de termined t h a t the p a r t i e s to the agreement of November 8, 1979 
were Poggio , F r anc i s and Ringwood r a t h e r than FAW and Ringwood. 
That d e c i s i o n was appealed to the Supreme Court of the S t a t e of 
Dtah and was affirmed in the case of Richard W. Ringwood v. Fore i 
Auto Works, Massimo C. Poggio , e t a l .
 f 671 P. 2d 182, (Utah 1983) 
9. In 1978 Gardner approached Poggio i n q u i r i n g concerning 
t h e p o s s i b l e purchase by Gardner of the Mazda f r a n c h i s e . Poggio 
expressed a lack of i n t e r e s t in 1978 in s e l l i n g the Mazda f ran-
c h i s e . 
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10. In'September of 1979 Gardner again approached Poggio 
concerning the possible purchase of the Mazda franchise. At that 
time Gardner inquired concerning the purchase of the Fiat franchise 
as well. 
11. On or about October 29, 1979, Gardner and Poggio signed 
a "Letter of Intent", plaintiff's Exhibit 1. The body of plain-
tiff's Exhibit No. 1 reads as follows: 
By this letter, We Dinero Service Leasing hereby intend to 
purchase the below stated Dealership located in Orem, Utah, 
known as, State Mazda & Fiat, from Mr. Max Poggio who 
intends to sell the above dealership for the dollar amount 
of $375,000.00. Terms of 10% down and 10-1/2% per annum for 
10 years unless sooner paid. Mr. Poggio will deliver 
unincumbered stock in the above named corporation with all 
debts paid at the time of purchase, or Dinero Service 
Leasing will buy the assetts [sic] of the corporation at the 
time of the final purchase. 
12. Either on October 29, 1979 or between October 29, 1979 
and November 10, 1979, Poggio informed Gardner of his contract 
with Ringwood and that Poggio was delinquent in making the 
required payments to Ringwood on the November 8, 1979 agreement. 
13. On November 10, 19 79, Gardner delivered a check drawn 
on the Hugh Gardner or Tony R. Hernandez Partnership Account at 
United Bank at Murray, Utah, in the amount of $10,000.00 payable 
to Poggio. Gardner understood that the $10,000 evidenced by 
plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2 was to be used by Poggio to bring 
current the payments owed Ringwood under the November 8 agreement. 
14. Sometime in 1979 prior to November 27, Poggio agreed 
with Howard R. Francis to, and did, purchase from Francis the 
stock which Francis owned in Foreign Auto Works on November 8, 
1978, including Francis's rights in the stock being purchased 
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from Ringwood. 
15. On or about November 27, 1979 /Gardner and Hernandez 
and Poggio executed a written agreement in the office of attorney 
Jackson Howard in Provo, Utah. The November 27 agreement was 
received into evidence as part of plaintiff's Exhibit 3. The 
November 27 agreement was executed by Massimo Poggic as Seller, 
by Gardner and Hernandez as Buyers. It was also signed by FAW by 
Poggio, the president of PAW. 
16. Gardner and Hernandez were represented in the drafting 
of the agreement of November 27, 1979 by attorney Paul Cotro-Manes 
of Salt Lake City. Poggio was represented by attorney Jackson 
Howard of Provo. On November 27, 1979 Poggio and Gardner and 
Hernandez and their respective attorneys knew of the November 8 
agreement and knew its terms. 
17. The November 27 agreement reads in part as follows: 
4. Assumption of Debt. There is attached hereto and 
made a part hereof as Exhibit "A" the following documents: 
1. A stock retirement agreement between Ringwood and 
Foreign Auto Works, Inc. 
2. A promissory note signed by PAW and guaranteed by 
Max Poggio, Rebecca Jane Poggio and Howard R. Francis. 
3. An escrow agreement. 
While the principal obligation to Ringwood is under 
the Stock Retirement Agreement, there has been executed 
as security for that obligation the promissory note. BUYERS 
shall assume the promissory note personally, pay it accord-
ing to its terms, and hold Poggio and Francis harmless from 
any liability thereunder. 
18. The third sentence of paragraph 11 of the November 27 
agreement reads as follows: 
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BUYERS s h a l l cause Foreign Auto Works, I n c . , by sepa ra t e 
agreement, a t t ached here to as Exhib i t " F " , to l e a se back the 
said premises to Max Poggio, t o g e t h e r with a l l p a r t s , 
supp l i e s and equipment t h e r e i n con ta ined , and toge the r with 
the Beck-Arnley D i s t r i b u t o r s h i p for the sum of $10,00 per 
y e a r , u n t i l such time as the o b l i g a t i o n of Foreign Auto 
Works to Ringwood i s ended by f i n a l payment. 
19. Paragraph 13 of the November 27 agreement provided as 
f o l l o w s : 
13. Warranty of SELLER. 
a. Poggio will cause FAW to pay all its obligations 
except those owing Ringwood and except contingent obligations 
under flooring contracts, . . . 
20. Paragraph 14 of the November 27 agreement reads as 
follows: 
14. Franchises. The continued existence of the two 
new automobile dealer franchises now owned by FAW from the 
Mazda Motors Pacific and Fiat Motors of North America, Inc., 
are the prime consideration under which Buyers are taking 
this option to acquire all of the stock of FAW. In the 
event that either or both Hernandez-Gardner (Buyers) should 
not, at the inception of this agreement, be acceptable to 
either Mazda or Fiat as either franchisees, in their own 
right, or as the principal and controlling persons of FAW, 
then in that event this agreement shall become null and void 
and any and all considerations paid by Buyers to Seller as 
either the initial purchase price or as monthly installments 
including non-competition payments, shall become immediately 
repayable by Seller to Buyers, and Buyers shall forthwith 
cause their resignations as corporate officers and directors 
of FAW to be submitted to the corporation, and shall also, 
forthwith deed back to Seller the real property described in 
Exhibit "B" hereto, and Seller shall cancel the trust deed 
given by the Buyers and the underlying promissory note 
thereto. This provision shall not apply to a later rejection 
of Buyers by Mazda or Fiat. 
21. The November 2 7 agreement provided that the Buyers 
would commence making payments on the purchase price on the first 
day of December, 1979. The agreement did not provide a date on 
which the buyers would take possession of the Foreign Auto Works' 
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assets. 
22. The buyers, Hernandez and Gardner, did not take possession 
of FAV* assets in the days following the execution of the November 
27 agreement, neither did they make any of the installment 
payments provided for by that agreement. 
23. On or about December 10, 1979 Foreign Auto Works issued 
a check payable to Anthony R. Hernandez in the sum of $10,000 for 
the purpose of refunding to Hernandez and Gardner the $10,000 
which Poggio received from Gardner on November 10. Following 
the delivery of the check from Poggio to Hernandez, Poggio 
consulted with his attorney, Jackson Howard, and Poggio subse-
quently stopped payment of said check. 
24. Following December 10, 1979 a meeting was had at the 
office of Jackson Howard among Poggio, Mr. Howard, Hernandez, 
Gardner, and Gardner and Hernandez's then attorney, Robert 
Reeder. Prior to the meeting, Poggio had disclosed to Mr. Howard 
that Gardner and Hernandez did not desire to purchase the real 
property which the November 27 agreement required them to do. As 
a result of the negotiations among Hernandez, Gardner, and Poggio 
and their attorneys, Howard and Reeder, another agreement, ("the 
December 29 agreement"), was prepared and executed on December 
29, 1979. 
25. The December 29 agreement was executed by the same 
parties and in the same fashion as was the November 27 agreement 
and the purchase price was $187,931.78 p|.us interest payable over 
time. 
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26. Paragraph 4 of the December 29 agreement was identical 
to paragraph 4 of the November 27 agreement. Paragraph 10 
of the December 29 agreement was nearly identical to paragraph 11 
of the November 27 agreement. 
27. The third sentence of paragraph 10 of the December 29 
agreement reads as follows: 
BUYERS shall cause Foreign Auto Works, Inc., by separate 
agreement, attached hereto as Exhibit "F", to lease back the 
said premises to Max Poggio, together with all parts, 
supplies and equipment therein contained, and together with 
the Beck-Arnley Distributorship, until such time as the 
obligation of Foreign Auto Works to Ringwood is ended by 
final payment. 
28. Paragraph 12(a) of the December 29 agreement reads as 
follows: 
12. Warrantv of SELLER. 
* , 
a. Poggio will cause FAW to pay all its obligations 
except those owing Ringwood and except contingent obligations 
under flooring contracts, and except installment conditional 
sales agreements or installment equipment purchased as 
listed in Schedule G. . . . 
29. Paragraph 15 of the December 29 agreement provided that 
Poggio would deliver the corporate books and records to Gardner 
and Hernandez upon the execution of the agreement. The December 
29 agreement contained no other provision with respect to the 
delivery of the possession of the FAW assets to the buyers. 
30. Following the execution of the December 29 agreement 
Gardner and Hernandez caused one of their employees to be present 
on a full time basis at the FAW place of business at 130 South 
State Street in Orem. 
31. The December 29 agreement provided that payments 
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should commence being made on the con t rac t on the 3rd day of 
J a n u a r y , 1980. Payments were a l loca ted by the con t rac t to the 
purchase p r i c e for the a s s e t s and to a covenant on the p a r t of 
Poggio not to compete, 
32. The i n s t a l l m e n t payments required to be made by 
the December 29 agreement were not pa id . 
33. On or about February 8, 1980, a wr i t t en agreement ("the 
February 8 agreement") was executed by Dinero S e r v i c e s , I n c . by 
Anthony Hernandez as P r e s i d e n t and Foreign Auto Works, I n c . by 
Poggio as P r e s i d e n t and by Poggio. The February 8 agreement was 
r e c e i v e d i n t o evidence as Exhib i t 5. The major a s s e t s being 
purchased were the Mazda and F ia t f r a n c h i s e s , p a r t s , and inven tory . 
The purchase p r i c e to be paid by the buyer was $175,000.00; 
$95,000.00 of which was to be paid on or before c l o s i n g , with the 
remaining $80,000.00 t o be paid under a promissory note over 
approx imate ly four y e a r s . This agreement was en tered in to for a 
number of r e a s o n s , inc lud ing ongoing d i s p u t e s as to the va lues of 
a s s e t s and the need of the s e l l e r for a d d i t i o n a l monies a t or 
n e a r the time of c l o s i n g , as opposed to r ece iv ing payments over a 
l o n g e r per iod of t ime . 
34. The February agreement contained no r e fe rence to the 
November or December agreements . 
35 . The February 8 agreement was prepared by counsel for 
Gardner and Hernandez. 
36. The February 8 agreement provided for the purchase of 
c e r t a i n of the a s s e t s of FAW r a t h e r than for the purchase of 
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stock as the November 27, 1979 and December 29, 1979 agreements 
had done. The assets to be purchased are described in paragraph 
2 of the February 8 agreement as follows: 
2. Assets to be Acquired: The property described in 
Exhibit "A" shall include: 
a. All new current Mazda parts in possession 
of SELLER on Feb. 8/1980. 
b. All new current Fiat parts in possession 
of SELLER on Feb. 8/1980. 
c. All used automobiles owned by SELLER and 
present on the premises upon Feb. 8/1980 at 130 So. 
State, Orem, Utah 84057. 
d. SELLER'S interest in the leasehold in that 
certain lease attached hereto as Exhibit "B"; 
e. All reserves from contracts presently held by 
any bank or any other party. 
f. All furniture, fixtures, equipment and signs 
in possession of SELLER at Feb. 8/1980. 
g. In addition to the foregoing assets to be 
sold, SELLER and each of the principal shareholders of 
SELLER agree not to compete with the BUYER in the sale 
of Mazda or Fiat automobiles as more fully set forth 
hereinafter. 
37. The "ebruary 8 agreement made reference to the obligation 
owed by Francis, Poggio, and FAW to Ringvood. Paragraph 3 E of 
the February 8 agreement reads as follows: 
Buyers will assume cost of defense in the event of any 
harassments by Richard Ringwood. 
38. Under paragraph 4 of the February 8 agreement entitled 
"Representations of Seller", paragraph (b) provided as follows: 
•SELLER and its shareholders and directors have taken all 
necessary steps and obtained all necessary approvals for the 
sale of the property contemplated by this Agreement with the 
exception Richard Ringwood contract;". 
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39. Paragraph 4(c) of the February 8 agreement reads as 
follows: 
c. SELLER owns all of the property described in Exhibit "A" 
hereto free and clear of all liens, security interest, 
including taxes and all other encumbrances, and SELLER has 
the full and unrestricted right to sell the same; 
40. Poggio, Gardner and Hernandez knew that the representation 
contained in paragraph 4(c) of the February 8, 1980 agreement was 
false. They all knew that Poggio had agreed by the terms of para-
graph 7 of the November 8 agreement not to make such a sale. 
41. Paragraph 10 of the agreement of February 8 provides as 
follows: 
10. Seller and Shareholder's Covenant Not to Compete: 
For and in consideration of a note in the principal 
amount of Eighty Thousand Dollars ($80,000.00) in the form 
and in substance as set forth in Exhibit mCm SELLER and the 
principal shareholder of SELLER, Max Poggio, agree not to 
compete with BUYER in the sale or servicing of new and used 
Mazda and Fiat automobiles within five miles of the present 
Orem location of SELLER'S premises for a period of five 
years from closing. 
42. A promissory note in the principal amount of $80,000 
written in terms almost identical with the payment provisions of 
the November 8, 1978 agreement was signed by Dinero Services, 
Gardner, and Hernandez and delivered to Poggio together with the 
February 8, 1980 agreement. 
43. As initially drafted, it appeared that the $80,000 to be 
paid pursuant to the promissory note provided for by paragraph 10 of 
the February 8, 1980 agreement was to enable Poggio to pay Ringwood. 
44. However paragraph 11 of the February 8, 1980 agreement to 
the effect indicated in paragraph 43 above, was deleted and the 
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deletion was initialed by Poggio and by Gardner. Before the deletio: 
that paragraph read as follows: 
11. Redemption Agreement: 
SELLER covenants in addition to its other covenants 
herein to take all steps necessary to satisfy its obliga-
tions to Richard W. Ringvood before closing by assigning the 
promissory note to be delivered herein or otherwise. SELLER 
will provide proof of such satisfaction at closing. 
45. February 8, 1980 was a Friday. After Poggio signed the 
February 8 agreement Gardner and Hernandez took possession and 
control of the Ma2da and Fiat dealership located in Orem, Utah. 
46. Gardner and Hernandez issued checks on February 11, 
1980 in payment of pre-February 8, 1980 outstanding debts of Foreign 
Auto Works and properly charged the sellers for those payments as 
supported by Exhibit 23 in the amount of $10,381.09 as part of the 
purchase price which Gardner and Hernandez paid Poggio. 
47. Gardner and Hernandez ostensibly under the name of 
Dinero Services Inc., individually and on behalf of FAW executed 
a further agreement dated April 14, 1980, "the agreement of 
April*. The agreement of April 14 was prepared by counsel for 
Gardner and Hernandez. The court finds that said agreement, as 
well as the agreement of February 8, 1980, were intended to be 
between Poggio, individually, and on behalf of FAW on the one 
hand and Gardner and Hernandez on the other; that Dinero Services 
Inc. was not considered by the parties as an operative entity as 
far as the dealings between the parties were concerned; that the 
said agreement of April 14, 1980, was intended by the parties to 
supercede all previous agreements and dealings between Poggio and 
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FAW on the one hand and Gardner and Hernandez on the other. This 
agreement was entered into between the parties because the 
February 8/ 1980, agreement had technically been terminated by 
the non-occurrence of a condition subsequent (transfer of the 
Mazda franchise by March 1, 1980), the representations of Mazda 
that the franchise would not be transferred to an entity which 
also operated the Fiat franchise, and because of continuing 
disagreement between the parties as to the value of the assets 
involved and the debts of FAW which had Bulk Sales implications. 
48. The assets to be acquired under the April 14 agreement 
were as follows: 
a. All new current Mazda parts in possession of SELLER 
as shown in the inventorv attached as a part of Exhibit 
• 1 " ; 
b. All movable Mazda signs owned by SELLER and in 
SELLER1s possession as shown in the inventory attached as a 
part of Exhibit •1"; 
c. All used automobiles owned by SELLER and present on 
the premises as shewn in the inventory attached as a part of 
Exhibit "1B; 
d. SELLER'S interest in the leasehold in that certain 
lease attached hereto as Exhibit "2"; 
e. All furniture, fixtures, and Mazda special equipment 
in possession of SELLER as shown in the inventory attached 
as a part of Exhibit "1"; 
f. In addition to the foregoing assets to be sold, 
SELLER and each of the principal shareholders of SELLER 
agree not to compete with the BUYER in the sale of Mazda 
automobiles as more fully set forth hereinafter. 
49. The April 14 agreement provided that the $80,000 note 
executed in connection with the February 8 agreement be returned 
by Poggio to Gardner and Hernandez. 
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50. The February 8 promissory note of S80,000 was returned 
to Gardner and Hernandez by Poggio's then attorney, Glen Ellis. 
51. Paragraph 4 of the April 14 agreement, at page 4, under 
•Representations of Seller" reads as follows: 
b. SELLER and its shareholder and directors have taken 
all necessary steps and obtained all necessary approvals 
for the sale of the property contemplated by this Agreement; 
52. Poggio, Gardner, and Hernandez and their counsel all 
knew that the representation in paragraph 4(b) was false. 
53. Paragraph 4(c) of the April 14 agreement reads as 
follows: 
c. SELLER owns all of the property described in Exhibit 
"1" and in the Escrow Agreement attached hereto free and 
clear of all liens, security interests, including taxes and 
all other encumbrances, and Seller has the full and unre-
stricted right to sell the same; 
54. Poggio, Gardner, and Hernandez and their counsel all 
knew that the representation in paragraph 4(c) was false. They 
knew that Poggio and FAW were parties to the November 8, 1978 
agreement which prohibited the sale. 
55. Gardner and Hernandez and their counsel were aware on 
November 27, on December 29, on February 8 and on April 14 of 
the fact that those contracts were in violation of the rights of 
Ringwood contained in the November 8, 1978 agreement between 
Poggio, Francis, and Ringwood. 
56. Paragraph 7 of the April 14 agreement was entitled 
"Documents to be Provided at Closing". Paragraph 7(g) reads as 
follows: 
g. The written consent of Richard W. Ringwood to this 
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transaction or his covenant not to sue the BUYER or BUYER'S 
principals. 
57. Paragraph 8 of the April 14 agreement dealt with the 
subject of •Closing". Paragraph 8 of the April 14 agreement 
reads as follows: 
Closing shall occur on the first business day following 
the date upon which BUYER has obtained (a! from Mazda Motors 
Pacific a new car franchise and all necessary State licenses 
for it to conduct the business contemplated by this Agreement; 
(b) the consent to the transaction or the covenant of 
Richard W. Ringwood not to sue the BUYER or its principals; 
and not later than May 1, 1980. 
58. The April 14 agreement provided in paragraph 11 as 
follows: 
11. Indemnification Agreement of Individuals: 
In this Agreement POGGIO has covenanted to take all 
steps necessary to satisfy the obligations to Richard K. 
Ringvood and creditors of SELLER before closing, POGGIO 
will provide proof of such satisfaction at closing, or in 
the event he cannot, BUYER will waive these covenants. In 
the event BUYER should waive these covenants at closing, 
POGGIO covenants and agrees to hold SELLER harmless and to 
indemnify SELLER from any and all claims and loss, including 
costs of investigation and costs and attorneys' fees arising 
from or relating to this contract and the predecessor 
hereto, including without limitation the claims of Richard 
W. Ringwood and the creditors of SELLER under the Bulk Sales 
Act. 
59. The November 27 agreement provided in paragraph 14 that 
if Gardner and Eernandez were not acceptable to either Mazda or 
Fiat as either franchisees in their own right or as principal and 
controlling persons of Foreign Auto Works, then in that event the 
agreement should become null and void and any and all considera-
tions paid by the buyers to the seller as either the initial 
purchase price or as monthly payments, including noncompetition 
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payments, should become immediately repayable from the s e l l e r to 
the buyer. 
60. Paragraph 13 of the December 29 agreement provided that: 
In the event that either or both Gardner-Hernandez (Buyers) 
should not, at the inception of this agreement, be acceptable 
to either Mazda or Fiat as either franchisees, in their own 
right, or as the principal and controlling persons of FAW, 
and no franchise shall be granted to them within 90 days, 
then in that event this agreement shall become null and void 
and any and all considerations paid by Buyers to Seller as 
either the initial purchase price or as monthly installments 
including non-competition payments, shall become immediately 
repayable by Seller to Buyers, • . • 
61. Paragraph 9 of the February 8 agreement provided that 
the agreement would be terminated unless Mazda Motors granted a 
new car franchise to Gardner and Hernandez by March 1, 1980. 
That paragraph further provided: 
Upon termination of this Agreement SELLER shall immediately 
return to BUYER any and all sums paid by the BUYER to the 
SELLER or advanced by the BUYER to the SELLER or its share-
holders. 
62. Paragraph 9 of the April 14 agreement provided as 
follows: 
9. Termination: 
This Agreement shall terminate and be of no further 
force and effect if by May 1, 1980, Mazda Motors Pacific 
shall not have granted to the BUYER a new car franchise 
necessary for it to engage in the sale and servicing of 
Mazda automobiles in the Provo-Orem area and BUYER shall not 
have obtained the necessary and requisite State licenses. 
This Agreement shall also terminate if the covenant and 
agreements of the Escrow Agreement are not fully and faith-
fully performed when due. Upon termination of this Agree-
ment SELLER shall immediately return to BUYER any and all 
sums paid by the BUYER to the SELLER or advanced by the 
BUYER to the SELLER, its shareholders, or creditors under 
this Agreement or prior hereto. 
63. The evidence does not disclose that Gardner and Hernandez 
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made any demand upon Poggio for the r e tu rn of any of the cons ider -
a t i o n paid by Gardner and Hernandez to Poggio a f t e r the de l ive ry 
by Gardner of the $10 f000 to Poggio on November 10, 1979. 
64. Poggio was on March 31 , 1980, and was a t the time of 
t r i a l , indebted to the United S t a t e s of America for unpaid taxes 
for the tax per iod ending March 31 , 1980, in the amount of $16,212.70 
a s shown by p l a i n t i f f ' s Exh ib i t 33. 
65. Poggio did not own a home in February or April of 1980. 
66. The r e a l p rope r ty r e f e r r ed to by the c o n t r a c t of 
November 27 which was de l e t ed by the con t r ac t of December 29 was 
f o r e c l o s e d upon by Poggio1s c r e d i t o r s . Poggio r e a l i z e d no equi ty 
t h e r e f r o m . 
67. The a s s e t s of va lue which Poggio possessed in November 
and December of 1979 and J anua ry , February, and Apri l of 1980 
c o n s i s t e d of h i s equ i ty in Foreign Auto Works and two o i l p a i n t -
i n g s . The two o i l p a i n t i n g s purpor t to have been painted by 
famous a r t i s t s and on t h a t b a s i s were appra ised for approximately 
$125,000; the genuiness of the p a i n t i n g s as works of famous 
a r t i s t s has not been e s t a b l i s h e d and without such c e r t i f i c a t i o n s , 
t h e p a i n t i n g s have a combined market value of approximately 
$ 4 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ; t h a t sa id p a i n t i n g s were removed by Poggio from the 
escrow e s t a b l i s h e d in connect ion with the Apr i l 14, 1980 Agreement, 
which removal was not with the approval of Gardner and Hernandez. 
68. Gardner and Hernandez t r i e d without success to s e l l the 
F i a t f r a n c h i s e between February 8 and Apri l 14 of 1980. 
69. Gardner and Hernandez sometime a f t e r May 1980 came to 
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be franchisees of the Mazda franchise and presently operate a 
Mazda franchise for the sale of new motor vehicles in Provo, 
Utah. 
70. Gardner and Hernandez were aware at all times between 
November 27, 1979 and April 14, 1980 that Poggio's and Francisfs 
contract with Ringwood precluded the sale of the Foreign Auto 
Works automobile franchises or of the Foreign Auto Works assets 
other than in the regular course of business so long as there was 
an outstanding unpaid purchase price owed Ring wood on Ringwood's 
contract of November 8, 1978. 
71. Between the dates of November 27 and April 14 Hernandez 
approached Ringwood and requested Ringwood to consent to the sale 
of the Foreign Auto Works assets to Gardner and Hernandez. 
Ringwood refused to assent to the transfer unless he was paid the 
amount owed to him by Poggio and by Francis. 
72. Credit for the 310,000 which was paid by Gardner to 
Poggio on October 29, 1979 and for the monies paid on February 
11, 1980 were taken by Gardner and Hernandez upon the purchase 
price of the April 14 agreement. 
73. All of the transactions between Poggio and Gardner and 
Hernandez considered the principal assets of interest to be the 
Mazda franchise, the new current Mazda parts, all movable Mazda 
signs, the interest of the sellers in the leasehold property in 
Orem, all furniture, fixtures and Mazda special equipment in 
possession of the sellers. All of the transactions provided 
for a covenant on the part of the seller not to compete in the 
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sale of Mazda automobiles. 
74. On June 12f 1981 agents of the United States Internal 
Revenue Service caused a tax lien to be filed against FAW for 
unpaid taxes for the period ending December 31, 1978 in the 
amount of $553.65. 
75. On June 3Cf 1981 agents of the United States Internal 
Revenue Service caused a tax lien to be filed against FAW assert-
ing unpaid taxes for the period ending December 31, 1979 in the 
amount of $5,246.52. 
76. On December 24, 1980, agents of the Internal Revenue 
Service caused a tax lien to be filed against FAW asserting 
unpaid taxes in the amount of $3,976.66 for the period ending 
December 19 79. 
77. On May 13, 1980 agents of the Internal Revenue Service 
caused a tax lien to be filed against FAW asserting unpaid 
federal taxes for the period ending June 1979 in the amount of 
$8,475-18. 
78. On March 3, 19 80 agents of the Internal Revenue Service 
caused tax liens to be filed against FAW asserting unpaid federal 
taxes in the amount of $6,414.17 for the period ending September 
1979. 
79. On July 14, 1980 agents of the Internal Revenue Service 
caused tax liens to be filed with the Utah County Recorder 
against FAW asserting unpaid Federal taxes in the amount of 
$4,124.18 for the period ending March 1980. 
80. On May 20, 1981 agents of the Internal Revenue Service 
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caused tax l i e n s to be f i l ed with the Utah County Recorder 
a s s e r t i n g t h a t Poggio owed unpaid Federal taxes in the amount of 
$16 ,212.70 for the period ending March 1980. (See paragraph 64 
above . ) 
8 1 . P l a i n t i f f Poggio ' s Exhibi t 32 evidences a warrant 
f i l e d with the o f f i c e of the Utah County Clerk by the S t a t e of 
Utah a s s e r t i n g unpaid taxes by FAW from April 1, 1979 to June 6, 
1979 in the amount of $9 ,994 .72 . 
82. I r r e s p e c t i v e of the foregoing, the evidence i s i n s u f f i -
c i e n t for the cour t to find by a preponderance t h a t e i t h e r Poggio 
o r FAVf was i n so lven t during any time when Ringwood was a t h i rd 
p a r t y b e n e f i c i a r y of any c o n t r a c t between Gardner and Hernandez 
a s p romis so r s and Poggio or FAW as promissee , p a r t i c u l a r l y by 
r e a s o n of the u n c e r t a i n value of Poggio ' s p a i n t i n g s and the 
absence of evidence as to the value of the FAVf s t o c k , a l l of 
which Poggio was the owner or c o n t r a c t purchase r . 
83. The unpaid ba lance of the purchase p r i c e owed Ringwood 
a s s e t fo r th in the November 8 agreement i s the sum of $80,024.84 
p r i n c i p a l . I n t e r e s t i s unpaid on the purchase p r i c e s i nce the 
12th day of January , 1980 and i s owed in the amount of $56,700.12 
t o October 15 , 1986 and a t the r a t e of $23.02 per day t h e r e a f t e r . 
84. P l a i n t i f f Ringwood had employed counsel and had 
a g r e e d to compensate c o u n s e l . Ringwood's a t t o r n e y , Da l l a s H. 
Young, J r . , was sworn and t e s t i f i e d t h a t h i s o f f i c e had rendered 
s e r v i c e s in the p r i n c i p a l amount of $14,041.85 to the d a t e of 
Oc tobe r 13 , 1986, which counsel for p l a i n t i f f v o l u n t a r i l y reduced 
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a t the time of t r i a l by the sum of S3,000 and t e s t i f i e d t h a t 
Ringwood was ob l i ga t ed for the unpaid por t ion of t h a t amount; 
t h a t the amount charged was reasonable and tha t the work performed 
was neces sa ry in the p rosecu t ion of the c a s e . 
85. That Gardner and Hernandez have paid or committed the 
fo l lowing sums pursuant to said agreement of Apri l 14r 1980: 
(a) $75 f076.79 acknowledged by Poggio on or about 
A p r i l 14, 1980; ( the cour t f inds t h a t with r e s p e c t to de f endan t ' s 
E x h i b i t s 27 and 28, these m a t t e r s were taken i n t o account in 
a r r i v i n g a t the f igure of $75,076.79 acknowledged by Poggio as 
having been received and t h a t as a consequence thereof Poggio was 
e n t i t l e d to r e c e i v e the funds r ep resen ted by said Exhib i t 28) 
(b) $15,000 on or about Apri l 15, 1980; 
(c) $10,000 on or about Ju ly 3 1 , 1980; 
(d) With r e s p e c t to payments claimed to have been made 
by Gardner and Hernandez upon said note by way of o f f s e t s allowed 
under paragraph 10 of the Apr i l 14, 1980 agreement ( p l a i n t i f f ' s 
Exhibit No. 1 0 ) , the cour t f inds as fo l lows : 
(1) Gardner and Hernandez did not r e ce ive t i t l e s 
to c a r s included in the s a l e in the amount of $13,649.90 (see 
p l a i n t i f f ' s Exhib i t 12, p l a i n t i f f ' s Exhib i t 15 and d e f e n d a n t ' s 
Exhibit 30) 
(2) The evidence does not support the claim of 
Gardner and Hernandez for an o f f s e t in the amount of $13,907.53 
for a l l e g e d "Payment to F i r s t S e c u r i t y by Zions to cure F i a t ' o u t 
of T r u s t 1 • • 
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(3) The evidence does not support the claim of 
Gardner and Hernandez for an offset in the amount of $12,600 for 
Poggio fs co l lec t ion of Mazda and Fiat warranty payments. 
(e) With respect to Exhibit 4 attached to p l a i n t i f f ' s 
Exhibi t No. 4 (Note claimed by Poggio to be for $80,000.00) and 
Exhibi t 4 appended to p l a i n t i f f ' s Exhibit No. 10 (Note claimed 
by Gardner and Hernandez to be for $30,583.02) the court finds 
t h a t ne i the r note has been establ ished by a preponderance of the 
evidence as representing a par t of the agreement between the 
p a r t i e s . (See, however, p l a i n t i f f ' s Exhibit 5 [personal hand-
wr i t t en memos of Poggio]) which contain the figure of $30,583.02, 
which f igure i s more nearly cons is tent with the balance purchase 
p r i c e a f t e r deducting the items noted in (a) (b) and (c) 
above.) 
86. That Gardner and Hernandez claim to have paid $6,500.00 
as a t torney fees in defending the claims of Rincwood; t ha t the 
evidence does not provide information in support of the reasonable-
ness of such charges or the necessi ty for and nature of the work 
genera t ing such charges. 
87. That there i s no evidence to support a contention tha t 
the purchase pr ice agreed to be paid by Gardner and Hernandez for 
the subject asse t s under the agreement of April 14, 1980 was 
unfa i r or was d ispropor t ionate to the value of such a s s e t s . 
88. Poggio in h is agreements with Ringwood i n i t i a l l y and in 
subsequent negot ia t ions and cont rac tura l r e l a t ionsh ips with 
Hernandez and Gardner acted of his own free w i l l , general ly 
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with the benef i t of the advice of lega l counsel , and not under 
t h r e a t or d u r e s s . 
89. Ringwood f i l ed an ac t ion on February 4, 1985 aga ins t 
de fendan t s Gardner and Hernandez claiming as a t h i r d p a r t y 
b e n e f i c i a r y of the agreement dated November 27, 1979. 
90. The p a r t i e s to the November 27, 1979 agreement 
in t ended Ringwood to be a t h i r d pa r ty bene f i c i a ry the reo f . 
9 1 . Ringwood did not r e l y upon, a s sen t to or sue on the 
November 27, 1979 agreement p r i o r to the time when Poggio as 
s e l l e r and Gardner and Hernandez as buyers entered in to the 
agreement of December 29, 1979. 
92. Ringwood did no t r e l y upon, a s sen t to or f i l e an ac t ion 
on the December 29, 1979 agreement p r i o r to the time when Foreign 
Auto Vicrks as s e l l e r and Dinero S e r v i c e s , I n c . as the o s t e n s i b l e 
buyer en tered in to the February 8, 1980 agreement. 
93 . Ringwood was intended to be an i n c i d e n t a l bene f i c i a ry 
on ly of the February 8, 1980 and Apri l 14, 1980 agreements 
between Poggio and Gardner and Hernandez. 
94. Poggio and FAW on the one hand and Gardner and Hernandez 
on the o the r intended t h a t the Apr i l 14, 1980 agreement should 
supercede a l l p revious agreements between them; t h a t the sub jec t 
m a t t e r of the Apr i l 14, 1980 agreement arose out of the same 
b a s i c d e a l i n g s and causes as a l l sa id p r i o r agreements between 
the p a r t i e s . 
95. That Gardner and Hernandez s t i l l owe the sum of 
$20 ,330 .27 on said purchase p r i ce on the agreement of Apr i l 14, 
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19 80 , and judgment should be g r a n t e d to Poggio and FAW for such 
a m o u n t , p l u s i n t e r e s t a t the l e g a l r a t e from A p r i l 1 4 , 1980 
t o g e t h e r w i th c o s t s of c o u r t h e r e i n expended by r e a s o n of such 
c l a i m . E v i d e n c e was no t o f f e r e d wi th r e s p e c t , t o any c l a im for 
a t t o r n e y f e e s . 
96 . Gardner and Hernandez have f a i l e d to s u p p o r t t h e i r 
c l a i m f o r a t t o r n e y f e e s a s an o f f s e t t o t he c l a im of Poggio in 
t h a t t h e r e i s n o t h i n g in the r e c o r d to show the r e a s o n a b l e n e s s 
o f t h e c l a imed c h a r g e s nor of t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r t he s e r v i c e s 
a l l e g e d t o have been p e r f o r m e d . 
Based upon t h e f o r e g o i n g , t h e c o u r t now makes and e n t e r s 
t h e f o l l o w i n g : 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1 . C la ims of Ringwood a g a i n s t P o g g i o , e t u x . , F r a n c i s 
and FAW; 
(a) The dec i s ion of t h i s c o u r t in Case No. 53579, 
a f f i rmed by the Utah Supreme Court of Utah (671 P. 2d 182) was 
n o t a d e c i s i o n on the m e r i t s of Ringwood1 s c la ims for the s a l e 
of h i s s tock and such d e c i s i o n i s not r e s j u d i c a t a so as to 
p r e c l u d e Ringwood from pursuing c la ims under the Agreement of 
November 8, 1979. 
(b) The sa id defendan ts Poggio and Franc i s have 
d e f a u l t e d in payments r equ i r ed under sa id agreement and have 
breached the terms thereof by reason of the s a l e of FAW 
a s s e t s wi thout the approval o r consen t of Ringwood and the 
s a l e of s tock between Franc i s and Poggio . 
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(c) Ringwoodfs remedy i s not l imi ted to a f o r f e i -
t u r e of money paid by defendan ts but i s e n t i t l e d to pursue 
h i s c la ims for the ba lance of the agreed purchase p r i c e under the 
p r o v i s i o n of paragraph 9 of sa id agreement which r e c i t e s : " . . . 
and f u r t h e r , S e l l e r s h a l l be f ree to pursue any o ther l ega l and 
e q u i t a b l e remedies a v a i l a b l e to S e l l e r . " 
(d) Defendants Massimo C. Poggio, Rebecca Jane Poggio, 
Howard R. F ranc i s and Fore ign Auto Works Inc . are indebted to 
Ringwood in the p r i n c i p a l sum of $80,024.84, with i n t e r e s t to 
December 22, 1986 in the amount of $58,265.45 and t h e r e a f t e r to 
d a t e of judgment in the amount of $23,02 per day; t ha t Ringwood 
has i ncu r r ed reasonable a t t o r n e y fees in the sum of $11,041.85 by 
r ea son of the d e f a u l t in performance of said defendan ts ; t ha t 
Ringwood i s e n t i t l e d to judgment aga ins t said defendants and each 
of them for the amounts above s e t for th toge the r with cos t s of 
c o u r t i n c u r r e d . 
2. Claims of Ringwood a g a i n s t Anthony Hernandez and Hugh 
Gardne r . 
(a) The evidence does not support the a l leged claim of 
a m a l i c i o u s and i n t e n t i o n a l conspi racy to depr ive Ringwood of h i s 
r i g h t s and such claim should be dismissed with p r e j u d i c e . 
(b) The claim for r e s c i s s i o n a l leged in the F i f th 
Cause of Action of Ringwood f s Second Amended Complaint i s not 
suppor ted by the evidence and should be dismissed with p r e j u d i c e . 
(c) Ringwood's a l l eged claim in s p e c i a l assumpsit 
should be d ismissed on the grounds t h a t the evidence does not 
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show by a preponderance t h a t the p r i c e agreed to be paid by 
Gardner and Hernandez for c e r t a i n a s s e t s of FAW was d i spropor t ion-
a t e to the value t he reo f . 
(d) Ringwood's claim t h a t he was a t h i r d - p a r t y bene-
f i c i a r y of agreements between Poggio and Hernandez and Gardner i s 
not supported by a preponderance of the evidence and should be 
d i smis sed with p r e j u d i c e for the following r easons : 
(1) Ringwood was only an i n c i d e n t a l bene f i c i a r y 
of the February 8, 1980 agreement and the superceding agreement 
of A p r i l 14, 1980. 
(2) Although Ringwood may have been a t h i r d - p a r t y 
b e n e f i c i a r y under the November 27, 1979 and December 29f 1979 
ag reemen t s , such agreements were superceded before Ringwood in 
any way assen ted t h e r e t o , r e l i e d upon or changed any p o s i t i o n as 
a consequence t he reo f . There i s evidence in the record to 
show Poggio was in f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t y in February and Apr i l 
1980. 
(e) The evidence does no t p repondera te in support of 
t h e c o n t e n t i o n t h a t Poggio or FAW was i n s o l v e n t a t a time when 
Ringwood was a t h i r d p a r t y b e n e f i c i a r y because of the unknown 
v a l u e of Pogg io ' s p a i n t i n g s and the complete lack of evidence as 
to t he va lue of FAK s tock a l l of which was held by Poggio or 
under c o n t r a c t to him; t h a t in any event the evidence f a i l s to 
demons t r a t e by a preponderance t h a t the agreed p r i c e to be paid 
by Hernandez and Gardner for FAK a s s e t s was d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e t o 
the f a i r v a l u e the reo f ; 
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(f) That all of Ringwood's claims against Gardner and 
Hernandez or either of them should be dismissed with prejudice 
and such defendants should be awarded their costs of court 
expended in defense of such claims. 
3. Claims of Poaaio and FAW against Gardner and Hernandez: 
(a) The April 14f 198C Agreement is the subsisting 
agreement between said parties; that Dinero Services Inc. was not 
intended by the parties to be the contracting party but that 
Gardner and Hernandez were the actual buyers and were obligated 
as such. 
(b) That the agreement of April 14, 1980 arises out of 
the initial transactions between the same parties; that the cause 
of action alleged in the Amended Complaint filed October 16, 
1986/ relates back to the time of the filing of the original 
cause of action and thus is not barred by the statute of limita-
tions. 
(c) That Gardner and Hernandez still owe the sum of 
$20#330.27 on said purchase price and judgment should be granted 
to Poggio and FAW for such amount, plus interest at the legal 
rate from April 14, 1980 together with costs of court herein 
expended by reason of such claim. The legal rate of interest on 
the contract debt is the amount of 6% per annum until the date 
of judgment. 
4. Counterclaim of Dinero Services Inc. and Gardner 
and Hernandez against Poggio and FAW: 
(a) Said counterclaim should be dismissed with prejudice. 
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The evidence by a preponderance shows that Gardner and Hernandez 
have failed to fully meet their commitments under said agreement. 
Gardner and Hernandez have failed to support their claim for 
attorney fees as an offset in that there is nothing in the record 
to show the reasonableness of the claimed charges nor of the 
necessity for the services alleged to have been performed. 
Dated: S^6^y ^ V , 1987. 
/ i 
!J BY THE COURT: 
CULLEN Y. CHRIS/SENS EN, Judge. 
\J 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
VAL R. ANTCZAK 
A t t o r n e y f o r Defendants 
Gardner and Hernandez 
ROBERT C. PILLERDP 
A t t o r n e y for P l a i n t i f f s Massimo C. 
P o g g i o and Rebecca Jane Poggio 
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APPENDIX C 
EXHIBIT 1 
PILED 
•OUHIH JIT" : : - i i!l:«r?<»CT •%•!?« 
f.r UTiM V:lS"''.r-'-'-:i -'if t.TAr* 
1335 OCT \h PM 12= U 
_j_-0£_:.-.-;^ VAL R. ANTCZAK JULIA C. ATTWOOD of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Hugh Gardner and Anthony R. 
Hernandez 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY-
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
RICHARD 
vs. 
W. RINGWOOD, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
FOREIGN AUTO WORKS, INC., and ) 
HOWARD R. FRANCIS, MASSIMO C. ) 
POGGIO, REBECCA JANE POGGIO, ) 
individually and in their ) 
capacities as shareholders, ) 
directors, officers or agents ) 
Of FOREIGN AUTO WORKS, INC., ) 
ANTHONY HERNANDEZ and HUGH ) 
GARDNER, ) 
MASSIMO 
FOREIGN 
vs. 
Defendants. ) 
"MAX" POGGIO and ) 
AUTO WORKS, INC., ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
» / 
HUGH GARDNER and ANTHONY R. ) 
HERNANDEZ, ) 
Defendants. ) 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 60,654 
* * * * * * * * 
On September 10, 1986 this Court allowed the plaintiffs 
to amend their Amended Complaint to state a claim for breach of 
the April 14, 1980 Agreement. Plaintiffs filed their Amendment 
to Amended Complaint on October 11, 198b. 
These defendants have earlier argued to tne Court that 
the proper defendant to an action on the April 14, 1980 Agreement 
is Dinero Services. Certainly, an action against Dinero Servic-
es, a new party, would not relate back to tne original filing of 
this Complaint under Rule 15(c) of the dtan Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. The Court nas already ruled against tnese defendants on 
that issue, concluding that defendant Hernandez and Gardner are 
the real parties in interest. These defendants will not attempt 
to reargue that ruling. 
Even assuming, nowever, tnat an action based on the 
April 14, 1980 Agreement does not require tne addition of a new 
defendant, the amendment does noc meet tne standard under Rule 
15(C) of tne Utan Rules of Civil Procedure for relation bacK: 
(c) whenever the claim or defense asserted in 
the amended pleading arose out of tne con-
duct, transaction, or occurrence, set fortn 
or attempted to be set fortn in tne original 
pleading, the amendment relates oack to the 
date of tne orginal pleading. 
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The only arguable reference to the April 14, 1980 Agreement in 
the Amended Complaint is contained in paragraphs 9 and 10: 
9. Defendants induced plaintiffs to enter 
into Agreements subsequent to the Agreement 
of December 29, 1979, but such subsequent 
agreements were without consideration to 
plaintiffs^ and should therefore be declared 
null and void. 
10. Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaratory 
judgment declaring agreements entered into 
between the parties subsequent to December 
29, 1979 agreement to be null and void and of 
no force and effect and declaring the Agree-
ment of December 29, 1979 to be the only 
bonding and valid agreement between the par-
ties. 
As has been stated-under the federal rule, "the primary 
purpose of Rule 15(c) is to assure that defendants have received 
adequate notice of claims within the limitations period and will 
not be unduly prejudiced by amendments to the complaint." 
Kaminski v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 586 F.Supp. 384, 386 
(S.D.N.Y. 1984). The allegations of the Amended Complaint cer-
tainly cannot be said to have put these defendants on notice that 
plaintiffs would claim breach of the April 14, 1980 Agreement. 
Indeed, the allegations of the Amended Complaint, that the 
December 29, 1979 Agreement alone was valid, lead to exactly the 
opposite conclusion. Plaintiff now seeks to sue on a totally 
independent contract and such a claim is certainly time barred: 
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Plaintiff's amendment falls squarely within 
Professors Wright and Miller's description of 
claims time barred under Rule 15, 
When plaintiff attempts to 
allege an entirely different 
transaction by amendment, as, for 
example, the separate publication 
of a libelous statement or the 
breach of an independent contract, 
the new claim will be subject to 
the defense of statute of limita-
tions, 
Wright & Miller, 6 Federal Practice and Pro-
cedure S 1497 at 489-90 (1971) • . . 
Emphasis supplied; Id. at 386. Plaintiffs are attempting to 
state claims which are clearly barred by the six year statute of 
limitations. Utah Code Ann. S 78-12-23 (1953). The claim stated 
in the Amendment to Amended Complaint does not arise out of the 
transaction or occurrence which was alleged in the Amended Com-
plaint and therefore cannot relate back to the date of filing the 
Amended Complaint. Consequently, the claim stated in the Amend-
ment to the Amended Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this lu\\l- day of October, 19jB6. 
^ o^-
VAL R. JCNTC: 
JULU/C. ATTWOQD 
of and for 
PXRSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Hugh Gardner and Anthony R. 
Hernandez 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P. 0. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered a copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss to the following this i4y^ day of October, 1986. 
Dallas H. Young, Jr. 
Ivy & Young 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Robert C. Fillerup 
1103 South Orem Blvd. 
Orem, Utah 84058 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT;:.://.j^ f
 f,,. 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD W. RINGWOOD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FOREIGN AUTO WORKS et al, 
Defendants. 
CASE NUMBER: 60,654 (65,314) 
RULING 
This matter comes before the Court, under Rule 2.8, on the 
motions of various parties seeking relief as hereinafter 
indicated. The Court has reviewed the file, considered the 
memoranda of counsel, entertained argument of counsel, and upon 
being advised in the premises, now makes the following: 
RULING 
1. Motion of Defendants Gardner and Hernandez for partial 
Summary Judgment 
(a) Said motion is denied as to Plaintiffs Poggio 
and Foreign Auto Works. While it is conceded by 
said Defendants Gardner and Hernandez that such 
Defendants were the actual parties to the agreement 
of April 14, 1980, the Court is of the opinion that 
a legitimate question of fact remains as to whether 
or not Plaintiff signed the April 14, 1980, agreement 
under duress. 
(b) Said motion as to Plaintiff Ringwood is denied. 
The Court is of the opinion that the claims of Ringwood 
against Hernandez and Gardner are "founded upon an 
instrument in writing" (Agreement of December 29, 1979) 
and thus governed by the six year statute of limita-
tions (Sec 78-12-23(2) UCA). 
The Court is further of the opinion that questions 
of fact remain concerning whether the contract upon 
which Ringood's third party beneficiary claims are 
based was rescinded before such third party claims 
could effectively attach and whether in any event 
Hernandez and Gardner exercised such dominion over 
the assets of FAW as should preclude them from 
excaping liability to Ringwood. 
2. Motion of Ringwood for Summary Judgment 
(a) Said motion is denied. 
Dated this <J\ day of September, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
cc: Dallas H. Young, Esq. 
Robert C. Fillerup, Esq. 
Val R. Antczak & Julie Attwood, Esq. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
RICHARD W. RINGWOOD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
FOREIGN AUTO WORKS, INC., and 
HOWARD R. FRANCIS, MASSIMO C. 
POGGIO, REBECCA JANE POGGIO, 
individually and in their 
capacities as shareholders, 
directors, officers or agents 
Of FOREIGN AUTO WORKS, INC., 
ANTHONY HERNANDEZ and HUGH 
GARDNER, 
Defendants. 
MASSIMO "MAX" POGGIO 
and FOREIGN AUTO WORKS, INC., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
HUGH GARDNER and ANTHONY R. 
HERNANDEZ, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 60,654 
Civil No. 65,314 
* * * * * * * 
Defendants Hernandez and Gardner hereby submit the 
following Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of 
their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in this action: 
UNCONTROVERTED FACTS 
1. On November 27, 1979, Max Poggio entered into an 
agreement (the "November Agreement") with Hugh Gardner and Tony 
Hernandez in which it was agreed that Gardner and Hernandez 
would purchase all of the outstanding stock of Foreign Auto 
Works, Inc. ("PAW") from Poggio. [Exhibit A] 
2. The November Agreement included the purchase by 
Gardner and Hernandez of Poggio's covenant not to compete, as 
well as the sale to Hernandez and Gardner of certain real 
property located in Orem, Utah. In addition, Hernandez and 
Gardner agreed to assume Poggio's responsibilities to Richard 
Ringwood arising from Poggio's contract to purchase 15,000 
shares of FAW stock from Ringwood. [Ex. A; Depo. I, 
p.27] [Citations to "Depo. I" refer to the deposition of 
plaintiff Poggio dated March 8, 1984. Similarly, citations to 
"Depo. II" will refer to plaintiff Poggio's deposition dated 
June 10, 1986. ] 
3. On December 29, 1979, Poggio, Gardner and 
Hernandez executed another contract (the "December Agreement"), 
the terms of which were essentially identical to those of the 
November Agreement, with the exception that the subsequent 
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agreement eliminated the real property purchase. The purchase 
price set forth in the December Agreement was therefore lower 
than that in the November Agreement. [Ex. B; Depo I, p. 35] 
4. Both the November and December Agreements 
provided for transfer to Hernandez and Gardner of automobile 
dealer franchises from Mazda Motors and Fiat Motors, and 
required Poggio's resignation as an officer and director of 
FAW. The purchase price under each agreement was determined, 
in part, by the outstanding liabilities of FAW, which were set 
forth by Poggio in exhibits to the agreements. [Exs. A & B] 
5. Within a matter of days after the execution of 
the December Agreement, the parties became involved in a number 
of disputes with respect to their performance under the 
contract, including, among other things, the existence of clear 
title to several automobiles that were transferred under the 
contract, the actual value of FAW's liabilities and Poggio's 
ability to transfer the Mazda and Fiat franchises. Numerous 
discussions took place between the parties regarding these 
matters. [Depo. I, pp. 50, 76, 80, 100-101] 
6. During December of 1979 and January of 1980, 
Poggio continued to operate the FAW store in Orem, although 
some employees of Hernandez and Gardner began working there as 
well. Hernandez and Gardner did not take over operation of the 
store until sometime in February of 1980. [Depo II, pp. 21-22] 
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7. The months of December, 1979 and January, 1980 
were "bad months" for the FAW store, resulting in losses and 
the incurrence of additional FAW liabilities. [Depo. I, pp. 
48, 83] 
8. On February 8, 1980, Poggio, Gardner and 
Hernandez executed yet another agreement (the "February 
Agreement") with respect to the purchase of FAW. The February 
Agreement changed the terms of the contract to eliminate the 
purchase of FAW stock, and provided instead that Gardner and 
Hernandez would purchase essentially all of the company's 
assets. [Ex. C] 
9. Although the named parties to the February 
Agreement were "Foreign Auto Works, Inc." and "Dinero Services, 
Inc.," the actual parties were in fact Poggio, Gardner and 
Hernandez, and Poggio testified that he believed that he was at 
all times dealing with the same party. [Ex. C; Depo. I, pp. 
47, 82, 123-24] 
10. The February Agreement also eliminated any 
assumption by Hernandez and Gardner of Poggio1s outstanding 
liability to Ringwood. [Ex. C] 
11. On April 14, 1980, Poggio, Gardner and Hernandez 
executed a final agreement (the "April Agreement") with respect 
to the sale and purchase of the assets of FAW. The April 
Agreement refers to the February Agreement, and expressly 
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provides that it "shall supplant and supersede all earlier 
agreements between these parties relating to the same subject 
matter." [Ex. D 11 12]. 
12. Under the April Agreement, Gardner and Hernandez 
did not agree to purchase any FAW stock, and did not agree to 
assume any liability for Poggio's debt to Ringwood. [Ex. D] 
13. Throughout these negotiations, both Poggio and 
Hernandez and Gardner were represented by attorneys, and in 
fact, at least some of the agreements were prepared and 
reviewed by attorneys on the parties1 behalf. [Depo. I, pp. 
14, 38, 117-18] 
14. On November 30, 1983, Poggio sued Hernandez and 
Gardner for breach of the November Agreement. [Complaint St 
Summons] 
15. On January 26, 1984, Poggio amended his Complaint 
to drop the claims based upon the November Agreement, and to 
allege instead a cause of action on the December Agreement. 
[Amended Complaint] 
ARGUMENT 
In making this motion, defendants have not submitted 
affidavits, nor relied in any way upon the testimony of either 
Hernandez or Gardner. The facts as stated herein are assumed 
to be true solely for the purposes of this motion, and were 
derived entirely from the pleadings and the testimony of 
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plaintiff Poggio. As such, there can be no dispute as to the 
material facts that have been stated herein. 
There is no dispute between the parties to this action 
regarding the fact that, as of November 27, 1979, Poggio, 
Hernandez and Gardner had a contract for the sale and purchase 
of the business known as Foreign Auto Works. There is likewise 
no dispute as to the fact that those parties subsequently 
executed three additional contracts, all relating to the same 
sale and purchase of FAW, although the precise terms of the 
subsequent agreements varied. Nonetheless, Mr. Poggio has 
chosen to assert claims in this action against Mr. Hernandez 
and Mr. Gardner on the basis of the December Agreement, the 
second in the parties1 series of four agreements. Poggio had 
initially asserted claims based upon the November Agreement, 
but subsequently amended his Complaint to allege December 
Agreement claims on the basis of defendants1 Motion to Dismiss, 
and an Affidavit by Tony Hernandez. Thus, plaintiff Poggio has 
clearly taken the position in this action that the December 
Agreement superseded and replaced the November Agreement. 
Likewise, the December Agreement was replaced by the February 
Agreement, which was ultimately superceded by the April 
Agreement. 
It is well established in Utah, as elsewhere, that a 
contractual agreement may be superseded by a subsequent 
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agreement which is between the same parties and covers the same 
subject matter. Thus, in the previous proceedings between 
plaintiffs Poggio and Ringwood, the Utah Supreme Court held 
that Poggiofs promissory note for the purchase price of 
Ringwood1s PAW stock was merged into, and superseded by, a 
subsequent written agreement between those parties for the sale 
and purchase of the same FAW stock. Ringwood v. Foreign Auto 
Works, Inc., 671 P.2d 182 (Utah 1983). In its decision, the 
Court considered that the contract and the note contained many 
similar provisions, and that correspondence between the 
parties' attorneys indicated that the subsequent agreement was 
intended to be a final settlement of controversies between the 
parties, and ruled that the contractual agreement should 
prevail. The court also found, incidentally, that the two 
agreements were between the same parties, although the note had 
been signed by Poggio individually and the contractual 
agreement was between Ringwood and FAW, since in reality, the 
contract purchaser was Poggio. 
The facts of the present case are even more 
compelling. In this case, there are four separate agreements 
between the same parties, all of which deal exclusively with 
the sale and purchase of FAW. Each of the agreements executed 
subsequent to the November Agreement resulted directly from 
disputes between the parties, and constituted an effort to 
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resolve those disagreements. All parties were represented by 
their own legal counsel throughout their dealings with each 
other, each of whom independently prepared, reviewed and 
modified various of the agreement terms. Finally, the April 
Agreement provides a clear expression of the parties' intent by 
stating that "this Agreement shall supplant and supersede all 
earlier agreements between these parties relating to the same 
subject matter." It is difficult to imagine what more these 
parties could have done to have more clearly expressed an 
intent to integrate their prior contracts into the final April 
Agreement than what they actually did. Nor has plaintiff 
Poggio ever suggested that such was not the intent of the 
parties in executing the subsequent agreements. 
Poggio offers two explanations for his reliance upon 
the December Agreement in this action: Lack of consideration 
for, and/or duress in connection with, the subsequent 
agreements. How plaintiff is able to differentiate between the 
December and the February and April Agreements in these 
respects is not clear. However, it must be assumed from the 
pleadings in this action that neither consideration nor duress 
is at issue with respect to the December Agreement, although 
that agreement similarly modifies a prior one. 
With respect to plaintiff's duress claim, Poggio 
specifically denied that his signing of the agreements with 
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Gardner and Hernandez was as the result of any threats made 
against him, and testified that he was not intimidated into 
signing those contracts. In fact, Poggio's testimony with 
respect to "duress" was as follows: 
Q. Given that you admit that the 
February 8th and April 14, 1980 
agreements were signed by you, why have 
you decided to sue on the December 27, 
1979 agreement? 
A. Because I believe that's the binding 
agreement. I signed the other 
agreements out of necessity, 
Q, Out of necessity? 
A. My own. The necessity of survival. 
Q. You needed money? 
A. I needed to do something with that 
because I couldn't sell it to somebody 
else because they had it and they had 
me over a barrel and I had to do 
something. 
Q. Did they hold a gun to your head or 
otherwise coerce you physically? 
A. No. 
[Depo. I, p. 117] • Interestingly, throughout his dealings in 
connection with these contracts, Poggio actively sought and 
received the advice of his independent counsel. As such, the 
only fact upon which Poggio relies in support of his duress 
claim is that he believed that, financially, he had no choice 
but to sign the agreements. 
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Such a claim is clearly insufficient to support a 
duress defense to a contract within the State of Utah. In 
fact, the elements of a duress defense in Utah are as follows: 
Thus, to invalidate a contract, a party 
thereto must show (1) that the other 
contracting party committed a wrongful act 
(2) which put the initial party in fear (3) 
such as to compel him to act against his 
will. 
Heglar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 
1980). In this case, Poggio has failed to offer any evidence 
whatsoever which would satisfy any one of the three elements of 
duress specified by the Utah Supreme Court. Therefore, his 
duress claim with respect to the February and April Agreements 
is simply without merit. 
Regarding plaintiff's consideration argument, each 
contract subsequent to the November Agreement was in fact 
supported by adequate consideration, since each of those 
contracts constituted an attempt by the parties to compromise 
disputes that had arisen in connection with their respective 
performances. In fact, Poggio testified that the parties were 
involved in constant disputes beginning almost immediately 
after their execution of the December Agreement. Poggio 
further testified that he accepted money from Hernandez and 
Gardner during the course of these disputes, which was not 
money due under the terms of the December Agreement. [Depo. I, 
pp. 64-65] It is well settled that the compromise of 
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legitimate disputes arising under a contract provides 
sufficient consideration to support a subsequent contract. See 
e.g., Burt v. Horn, 97 N.M. 515, 641 P.2d 546 (Ct.App. 1982); 
Jim's Water Service, Inc. v. Alinen, 608 P.2d 667 (Wyo. 1980); 
Fieser v. Stinnett, 212 Kan. 26, 509 P.2d 1156 (1973), as does 
an additional tender of value. Both kinds of consideration 
exist in the present case, and as such, plaintiff's argument 
that the contracts subsequent to the December Agreement were 
not supported by consideration is simply not supported by the 
uncontroverted facts . 
In addition, the Utah Legislature has provided in the 
Uniform Commercial Code, that "an agreement modifying a 
contract within this chapter needs no consideration to be 
binding." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-209. This principle is 
especially appropriate where, as here, the contracting parties 
are sophisticated businessmen, dealing at arm's length, with 
the benefit of independent legal counsel. Therefore, if the 
contracts at issue in this action fall within the scope of 
Utah's U.C.C., then plaintiff's lack of consideration argument 
is similarly without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants are entitled to judgment in their favor, as 
a matter of law, as to any and all claims in these actions 
which are based upon the November 27, 1979 or the December 29, 
1979 contract between them and plaintiff Poggio, since those 
agreements were superseded in their entirety by two subsequent 
contracts. 
DATED this 11 day of June, 1986. 
^1 ^r-?i 
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XAIr R. ANTCZAK 
JULIA C|. ATTWOOD 
of anid for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Hernandez and Gardner 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P. 0. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT to the following 
on this 2"? ®~ day of June, 1986: 
Dallas H. Young, Jr. 
IVIE & YOUNG 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Robert C. Fillerup 
1103 South Orem Boulevard 
Orem, Utah 84058 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
RICHARD 
VS. 
FOREIGN 
W. RINGWOOD, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
i / 
AUTO WORKS, INC., and } 
HOWARD R. FRANCIS, MASSIMO C. ) 
POGGIO, REBECCA JANE POGGIO, ) 
individually and in their ) 
capacities as shareholders, ) 
directors, officers or agents ) 
Of FOREIGN AUTO WORKS, INC., ) 
ANTHONY 
GARDNER, 
MASSIMO 
FOREIGN 
VS. 
HERNANDEZ and HUGH ) 
f ) 
Defendants. ) 
"MAX" POGGIO and ) 
AUTO WORKS, INC. , ) 
Plaintiffs/ ) 
» ) 
HUGH GARDNER and ANTHONY R. ) 
HERNANDEZ, ) 
Defendants. ) 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 60,654 
Civil No.. 65,314 
* * * * * * * * 
Defendants Hernandez and Gardner, by and through their 
attorneys, hereby submit the following memorandum in support of 
their motion for partial summary judgment in this action: 
ARGUMENT 
Defendants Hernandez and Gardner have moved for partial 
summary judgment in this action on the ground that the majority 
of plaintiffs1 claims are based upon supposed legal rights aris-
ing out of an agreement between plaintiff Poggio and defendants 
dated December 29, 1979, which agreement was superseded and 
replaced by two subsequent contracts. Plaintiff Poggio1s 
response to the motion is based almost exclusively upon the 
existence of a previous motion to dismiss and the accompanying 
Affidavit of Anthony Hernandez* Plaintiff argues from those two 
documents that defendants have somehow admitted that the December 
Agreement is the only valid contract. 
The Hernandez Affidavit and the memorandum in support 
of the motion to dismiss have been attached hereto as Exhibits A 
and B for the Court's reference. These documents speak for 
themselves. However, it is clear from even a cursory review of 
them that nothing contained therein even remotely resembles a 
statement or admission that the December Agreement is the only 
valid contract between the parties. Essentially, both documents 
simply state that "a second agreement was entered into," 
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subsequent to the November Agreement, which superseded that con-
tract in its entirety. The memorandum adds an argument to the 
effect that the December Agreement was supported by considera-
tion, and therefore validly superseded the previous contract* 
There is no suggestion, in either the Affidavit or the memoran-
dum, that the February and the April Agreements are in any way 
defective. Nor was it defendants1 intention to mislead plaintiff 
in any way by their reliance upon the December Agreement, rather 
than on either of the subsequent ones. 
The choice to use the December Agreement in connection 
with the motion to dismiss was a tactical decision made by 
defendants1 counsel in order to simplify the arguments in favor 
of the motion. At that time, prior to the taking of any discov-
ery, it was simply considered to be less complicated to defeat 
the complaint with the next most subsequent contract, which 
agreement was clearly between the "same" parties, and which 
expressly provided that it was intended to supersede the previous 
one. In fact, defendants fully expected that plaintiff would 
refile his complaint on the basis of the April, rather than the 
December, Agreement. 
In any event, nothing that has transpired in this case 
can reasonably or fairly be construed as a binding admission by 
defendants that the contracts subsequent to the December 
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Agreement were, or are, in any way defective. As indicated in 
defendants1 previous memorandum, there are no material issues of 
fact with respect to the validity of the contracts executed sub-
sequent to the December Agreement. Plaintiff has admitted that 
he signed all four of the agreements, that he did so in the 
absence of the compulsion necessary for the defense of duress, 
that he was represented by counsel, and that the subsequent 
agreements were supported by legally valid consideration. 
Plaintiff briefly alleges in his current memorandum that the 
subsequent agreements (1) were between "different" parties, and 
(2) are not considered by him to be "valid." Neither one of 
these allegations is sufficient to defeat defendants1 entitlement 
to judgment in their favor as a matter of law. 
With respect to plaintiff's first argument, the evi-
dence is uncontroverted that the individuals involved in all of 
the contracts were identical, and that all of them believed that 
they were dealing with the same parties at all times. (See 
Defendants' previous memorandum; Deposition of Plaintiff Poggio, 
dated March 8, 1984, pp. 47, 82, 123-24.) Substantially similar 
facts in connection with the Ringwood/Poggio agreements were 
considered by the Utah Supreme Court to be sufficient to estab-
lish that the two agreements in that case were between the "same" 
parties. See Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 671 P.2d 182 
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(Utah 1983). To hold otherwise would be the elevation of form 
over substance in its most basic sense. 
Secondly, plaintiff's mere allegation that he does not 
consider the subsequent agreements to be valid is simply not 
sufficient to undermine those agreements1 inherent validity. 
Plaintiff has offered no evidence in support of this allegation, 
beyond his assertions that the subsequent contracts were the 
result of duress, and offering the statement by defendants that 
they believed they were "paying too much for the store." In 
connection with this motion only, defendants do not dispute that 
such a statement was made. However, the statement itself is 
entirely consistent with the uncontroverted evidence that the 
series of agreements arose out of the parties1 disputes with 
respect to the value of the store, which had been determined, in 
part, by the existence of liabilities and the stated value of the 
inventory. Certainly, in light of this disputes, defendants 
believed that they were in fact "paying too much" for what they 
would receive. Plaintiff does not argue in this regard that 
there were not in fact ongoing disputes between the parties, and 
the agreements themselves recite the existence of valid consid-
eration. 
Moreover, as detailed in defendants1 previous memoran-
dum, plaintiff in fact received and accepted additional 
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consideration from defendants in connection with the execution of 
the February and April Agreements. Plaintiff's current 
conclusory statement to the effect that the subsequent contracts 
"are not valid" is not sufficient, without reference to specific 
facts, to create a material issue of fact which would be suffi-
cient to defeat defendants1 motion in this case. See Williams 
v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985); Reagan Outdoor Advertising, 
Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776 (Utah 1984). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants are entitled to judgment in their favor as a 
matter of law with respect to any claims made against them in 
this action which are based upon the December or the November 
agreements between the parties, for the reason that those con-
tracts were superseded and replaced by subsequent contracts 
between the parties. 
DATED this IJ day of July, 1986. 
I L | / ( V, J t_ C '. 
-JULIA/ C. ATTWOOD 
of/and for 
PARS6NS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendants 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P. 0. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
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